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INTRODUCTION 
In November of 1934, former Louisiana Governor James A. Noe, 
along with several associates, formed the Win or Lose Corporation “to 
acquire, sell, trade and exchange lands and leases for the drilling and 
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prospecting for oil, gas and other minerals . . . .”2 In the following years, 
the Win or Lose Corporation acquired interests in several mineral leases 
on land owned by the State of Louisiana, some of which are still in 
operation today. For the past eighty-two years, the former governors and 
their descendants and assigns profited off of the lessees’ shares of royalties 
paid from these State mineral leases. However, this profiting has been 
perceived by some to be the result of an unjust enrichment by a select few 
politically, connected individuals to the financial detriment of the State of 
Louisiana.3 
As a result of these perceptions and a recent resurgence in interest in 
these leases, the State Mineral and Energy Board requested that the 
Louisiana Attorney General analyze allegations of wrongdoing 
surrounding Win or Lose’s involvement in these leases. In 2013, the 
Louisiana Attorney General’s Office published a report on the issue.4 This 
article serves as a modified, updated, and scaled-down version of that 
report, and is intended to preserve the analysis of these matters in an 
accessible format for posterity. Included in this article is a review of the 
historical context of this matter, a review of past litigation of, and 
investigations into, the Win or Lose matter, and a comprehensive analysis 
of the legality and validity of what have become known as the Win or Lose 
leases under the law in force at the time that the leases were granted. This 
analysis leads to the conclusion that the leases were granted in accordance 
with the law in force at the time of their issuance and that the State received 
(and continues to receive) its legally mandated royalty share of minerals 
produced from these leases and, in some cases, more. No evidence has 
been identified or discovered to support any theory or claim that the Win 
or Lose leases were illegally obtained or that they have been unlawfully 
held. In addition, no evidence has been identified to suggest that the former 
governors or their heirs and assigns are or have historically received any 
royalties or other funds from these leases that should have been paid to the 
State. Finally, this analysis has identified no legal basis for the rescission 
or cancellation of the Win or Lose leases and has determined that such a 
rescission or cancellation, were it legally available, would not be in the 
best interests of the State of Louisiana. In fact, this analysis indicates that 
2. Articles of Incorporation of Win or Lose Corporation 2 (Nov. 21, 1934)
(on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
3. See, e.g., Lee Zurik, Lee Zurik Investigation: ‘Dirty Deeds’ Cost Louisiana
Hundreds of Millions, Fox 8 WVUE, Aug. 7, 2013, fox8live.com/story/18067615 
/lee-zurik-investigation-dirty-deeds-cost-louisiana-hundreds-of-millions [https: 
//perma.cc/T73F-H9VK], aired Aug. 7, 2013 [hereafter Zurik one]. 
4. See RYAN M. SEIDEMANN, ETHEL S. GRAHAM, WILLIAM T. HAWKINS,
STEVEN B. JONES & FREDERIC AUGONNET, LA. ATT’Y GEN., AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
LEGALITY AND VIABILITY OF MINERAL LEASES GRANTED TO W.T. BURTON AND 
JAMES A. NOE DURING THE YEARS 1934–1936 (2013). 
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such legal action would be unsuccessful and would actually be detrimental 
to the interests of the State. 
I. WHAT IS WIN OR LOSE CORPORATION? 
The Win or Lose Corporation (herein referred to as Win or Lose) was 
founded on November 20, 1934. According to its Articles of 
Incorporation, its purpose is to “acquire, sell, or exchange lands and leases 
for the drilling and prospecting of oil, gas, and other minerals . . . .”5 The 
president of the corporation is listed as James A. Noe of Monroe, 
Louisiana; the vice-president as Seymour Weiss; and the secretary-
treasurer as Earle Christenberry.6 The initial capital stock of the 
corporation included a ten thousand dollar investment, comprised of one 
hundred shares.7 According to later documents, Seymour Weiss and Earle 
Christenberry only held one share each, with the remaining ninety-eight 
shares being held by James A. Noe.8 
The question of the corporation’s alleged impropriety stems from: (1) 
the relationship between Win or Lose and then-current and former State 
government officials; and (2) the subsequent transfer of shares to Senator 
Huey P. Long and Governor Oscar K. Allen, as well as several other select 
individuals.9 Specifically, as to the corporation’s officers, James A. Noe, 
the president of Win or Lose Corporation, was Louisiana’s Governor for 
three and a half months,10 following the unexpected death in office of 
Oscar K. Allen;11 Seymour Weiss was one of Huey P. Long’s oldest 
confidants and managed his campaign war chests;12 and Earle 
Christenberry was Huey Long’s personal secretary.13 
The individuals that played a role in the Win or Lose Corporation’s 
history are legendary in Louisiana. It is their infamous nature that has 
5. Articles of Incorporation of Win or Lose Corporation 2 (Nov. 21, 1034)
(on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id.
8. Trial Transcript at 92, United States v. Noe (E.D. La. 1942) (No. 20,070)
(citing testimony of Earle J. Christenberry) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice) 
[hereinafter United States v. Noe Trial Transcript]; see also T. HARRY WILLIAMS, 
HUEY LONG 825 (Knopf 1970). 
9. See, e.g., Zurik one, supra note 3.
10. Noe had also served as the Lieutenant Governor of Louisiana and as a
State Senator. Alex McManus, The Political Career of James A. Noe 11 (M.A. 
Thesis, Univ. of La. at Monroe 2005) (copy on file with author). 
11. Id. at 44.
12. RICHARD D. WHITE, KINGFISH: THE REIGN OF HUEY P. LONG 80
(Random House 2006). 
13. WILLIAM IVY HAIR, THE KINGFISH AND HIS REALM 232 (La. State Univ.
Press 1991). 
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colored perceptions of the validity of the mineral leases that ultimately 
ended up as partially held by those individuals and the corporation over 
the years. Yet, as noted by historian J. Eric Pardue, the Win or Lose 
Corporation’s involvement in mineral leasing from the State of Louisiana 
was “of questionable morality but complete legality.”14 
Also apparent in the historical treatment of the Win or Lose 
Corporation is a tendency for temporal relationships among and between 
activities to be ignored or otherwise glossed over. Pardue provides an 
important example of this, commenting that, “the thirty-one shares Noe 
gave Huey earned $62[,000] for the governor in the first year of 
ownership.”15 Although the amounts in this quotation may be correct, the 
quote implies that Long was governor when the shares and money were 
received. However, he was not. In fact, the Win or Lose Corporation was 
not formed until two years after the end of Long’s only term as governor.16 
Thus, the implication that Long, as a sitting governor, was given shares of 
a corporation making money from State leases is simply incorrect.17 
Indeed, as Earle Christenberry later testified in the tax evasion trial of 
James A. Noe, the Longs gained their title ownership interest in the Win 
or Lose Corporation by way of a stock issuance to Mrs. Huey P. Long in 
1936.18 Yet, Christenberry also testified that Long had held one of the 
stock certificates issued to Noe—thirty-one shares—during his lifetime 
and that the same was part of Long’s succession.19 According to 
Christenberry, Oscar K. Allen also held a stock certificate issued to Noe—
twelve shares—during his lifetime and those stocks were part of Allen’s 
14. J. Eric Pardue, Jimmie, Huey, Sam, and Earl: Longism in James A. Noe’s
1940 Gubernatorial Campaign, in 37 NORTH LOUISIANA HISTORY 102, 105 (2006). 
15. Id. at 104–05.
16. Huey P. Long served as Governor of Louisiana from 1928–1932. LA.
SEC’Y OF STATE, Governors from 1877-Present, sos.la.gov/historicalresources 
/aboutlouisiana/louisianagovernors1877-present/Pages/default.aspx [https: 
//perma.cc/S76S-3EWQ]. 
17. It should be noted, however, that O.K. Allen was a sitting governor when
he received shares in Win or Lose, and James A. Noe was a sitting Louisiana State 
Senator and lieutenant governor when he received shares of Win or Lose. 
18. United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8, at 104–05 (citing
testimony of Earle J. Christenberry). This is not to suggest that Huey Long did 
not have a substantial role in the formation of the company just prior to his death. 
He did. According to the testimony of Alfred D. Danziger, Huey Long was present 
at the signing of the Win or Lose charter in 1934 and, though he was not an owner 
of the company, he certainly provided advice to James A. Noe regarding the 
original development of State Lease 309. For the former, see id. at 86–87 (citing 
testimony of Alfred D. Danziger). For the latter, see id. at 49–54 (citing testimony 
of Leonard M. Levy). 
19. Id. at 105–06 (citing testimony of Earle J. Christenberry). This reality is
corroborated by the information in Huey P. Long’s succession. See Succession of 
Huey P. Long (Orl. Parish, 1938) (No. 215-671) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
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succession.20 In fact, although the original incorporators are shown as 
James A. Noe, Seymour Weiss, and Earle J. Christenberry, IRS 
Intelligence Agent Frank W. Lohn succinctly summarized the ownership 
of the Win or Lose Corporation in his testimony in the matter of U.S. v. 
Noe:21 
Mr. Noe said that when the company was first organized, he 
owned [ninety-eight] shares, Mr. Weiss, one share and Mr. 
Christenberry, one share, that immediately afterwards the stock 
was split up so that Senator Long owned [thirty-one] shares, he 
[Noe] owned [thirty-one] shares, Mr. Weiss [twenty-four] shares, 
Governor Allen [twelve] shares, and Mrs. Alice Lee Grosjean, one 
share, and Mr. Christenberry, one share.22 
Lohn’s recitation of the division of Win or Lose Corporation shares 
was later supported by Earle J. Christenberry’s testimony in the same 
trial.23 
Further, when academic sources such as Jeansonne comment that, 
“[p]rofits that should have gone to the state went to Long and his 
cronies,”24 it is not surprising that the public and press often develop 
misconceptions regarding whether the State received what it was due 
under the Win or Lose leases.25 The “profits” to which Jeansonne refers 
are monies realized by the Win or Lose Corporation for the royalties, 
assignments, or subleases of State mineral leases. The issuance of such 
assignments and subleases by lessees were not, as is examined below, 
20. United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8, at 106–07 (citing
testimony of Earle J. Christenberry). This reality is corroborated by Oscar K. Allen’s 
succession. See Succession of Oscar Kelly Allen (La. 8th J.D.C. 1936) (No. 777) 
(listing certificate for twelve shares of the Win or Lose Corporation transferred to O.K. 
Allen under the personal property section of the succession inventory). 
21. As set forth more fully below, the matter of United States v. Noe was a
tax evasion trial brought against James Noe, Seymour Weiss, and the Win or Lose 
Corporation by the federal government. 
22. United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8, at 248 (citing
testimony of Frank W. Lohn). 
23. See id. at 92 (citing testimony of Earle J. Christenberry).
24. GLEN JEANSONNE, MESSIAH TO THE MASSES: HUEY P. LONG AND THE
GREAT DEPRESSION 160 (Harper Collins 1993). 
25. A classic example of such misconceptions was published in THE 
ADVOCATE: 
[Huey] Long held shares in the Win or Lose Corp., which leased mineral 
rights on state-owned property. The leases did not cost Win or Lose 
anything because they were turned over to the company by the governor. 
Editorial, Huey: The ‘[O]ther’ Long, THE ADVOCATE, Aug. 26, 2013, at 12C. As 
is seen herein, Huey Long did own shares of Win or Lose; Win or Lose also held 
rights in State mineral leases. However, none of the leases, as is developed herein 
were given at no cost to the company by any governor. 
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unlawful activities, and the financial benefits of those activities were not 
supposed to be escheated to the State. The assumption in Jeansonne’s 
statement is that, had the State retained the Win or Lose leased areas and, 
in turn, successfully leased those areas on its own, then the State would 
have received a higher original lease amount. Thus, this statement assumes 
at least two events, neither of which occurred, in order to support a belief 
that profits were misappropriated to the Long political machine.26 Further, 
because the assigning or subleasing lessee would retain any profits 
realized from assignments of subleases, the State would not have realized 
any of those funds in any event. Thus, an inflammatory statement that the 
State was swindled out of large sums of money is based on two 
assumptions and an incorrect understanding of the law—a troubling reality 
for an academic publication. 
A. Huey P. Long 
Huey P. Long served as the fortieth Governor of Louisiana from 1928 
to 1932. Subsequently, he was elected to the United States Senate and 
served in that capacity until his assassination in 1935.27 Long went from 
relative obscurity in Winn Parish to notoriety as the self-titled “Kingfish” 
of Louisiana. Numerous biographies and innumerable articles detail the 
26. The assumed events are that the State would have otherwise attempted to
and successfully would have leased these same areas to someone other than the 
Win or Lose interests and that such leases would have garnered more from the 
State than the Win or Lose leases. 
27. WHITE, supra note 12, at ix.
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life and political career of Huey Long,28 making a comprehensive review 
here redundant. His political career began with his election to the 
Louisiana Railroad Commission in 1918 on a populist platform from 
which he would never fully step away.29 Later, Long ran for governor in 
1924 but lost.30 Undeterred, he ran again in 1928 and won.31 Once in 
office, Long quickly consolidated his political power by means of 
nepotism, legal maneuvering, and outright bullying.32 Historians continue 
to debate Long’s motivations, but the means by which he accomplished 
his goals is less debatable. In this regard, Long’s Louisiana is widely 
analogized in the historical literature to a dictatorship in which 
intimidation and suppression was often used to ensure that Long’s plans 
were effectuated. A common theme in historical circles is that, under 
Long’s political control, Louisiana no longer resembled a democracy; 
instead, all matters of the State were vested in one individual and were 
dependent upon his whims and moods.33 
Long’s control of Louisiana was near absolute,34 and the men who 
were the founders of the Win or Lose venture made up his closest circle.35 
28. See, e.g., LOUISIANA POLITICS: FESTIVAL IN A LABYRINTH (James Bolner ed.,
1982); Henry C. Dethloff, The Longs: Revolution or Populist Retrenchment?, in 19 
LOUISIANA HISTORY 401–12 (1978); LA. STATE MUSEUM, HUEY PIERCE LONG: THE 
MARTYR OF THE AGE (James Joseph Alcée Fortier ed., 1937); HUEY LONG (Hugh 
Davis Graham ed., 1970); Edward F. Haas, Huey Pierce Long and Historical 
Speculation, in 27 THE HISTORY TEACHER 125 (1994); HAIR, supra note 13; THOMAS 
O. HARRIS, THE KINGFISH: HUEY P. LONG, DICTATOR (Pelican Publ’g Co. 1938); 
ELMER L. IREY & WILLIAM J. SLOCUM, THE TAX DODGERS: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
THE T-MEN’S WAR WITH AMERICA’S POLITICAL AND UNDERWORLD HOODLUMS 
(1948); Glen Jeansonne, Huey P. Long: A Political Contradiction, in 31 LOUISIANA 
HISTORY 373 (1990); Glen Jeansonne, Huey P. Long, Gerald L. K. Smith and Leander 
H. Perez as Charismatic Leaders, in 35 LOUISIANA HISTORY 5 (1994); HUEY AT 100: 
CENTENNIAL ESSAYS ON HUEY P. LONG (Glen Jeansonne ed., 1995); HARNETT T. 
KANE, HUEY LONG’S LOUISIANA HAYRIDE: THE AMERICAN REHEARSAL FOR 
DICTATORSHIP 1928–1940 (Pelican Publ’g Co. 1971); REINHARD H. LUTHIN, 
AMERICAN DEMAGOGUES: TWENTIETH CENTURY (1954); ROBERT MANN, LEGACY 
TO POWER: SENATOR RUSSELL LONG OF LOUISIANA (Paragon House 1992); ALLAN 
P. SINDLER, HUEY LONG’S LOUISIANA: STATE POLITICS, 1920–1952 (Johns Hopkins 
Press 1956); WEBSTER SMITH, THE KINGFISH: A BIOGRAPHY OF HUEY LONG (1933); 
Courtney Vaughn, The Legacy of Huey Long, in 20 LOUISIANA HISTORY 93 (1979); 
WILLIAMS, supra note 8; T. Harry Williams, The Gentleman from Louisiana: 
Demagogue or Democrat, in 26 JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 3–21 (1960); 
WHITE, supra note 12. 
29. HAIR, supra note 13, at 86–88. The Louisiana Railroad Commission is
now known as the Louisiana Public Service Commission. 
30. WHITE, supra note 12, at 18.
31. Id. at 35–36.
32. Id. at 39, 45.
33. See, e.g., id. at 125.
34. For details, see HAIR, supra note 13, at 276–97.
35. Namely, James Noe, Seymour Weiss, and Earle Christenberry.
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Long was neither a founder nor an original shareholder of Win or Lose 
Corporation, but he clearly knew the details of the company’s formation, 
methods, and purposes.36 In fact, despite the interest that Long held in the 
company, his name does not show up on the Win or Lose paperwork until 
after his death in 1935.37 
B. Oscar K. Allen 
At the time during which the Win or Lose Corporation was founded, 
the State of Louisiana was under a “Long dictatorship.”38 Although by 
1934, Huey P. Long was a United States Senator, where he continued to 
exercise substantial power in Baton Rouge.39 It is now widely accepted 
that Long had largely installed Oscar K. Allen as the then-current governor 
knowing that he could control Allen and thereby maintain control over 
Louisiana. Thus, Long would hold both a position as a Senator, and 
influence over the gubernatorial office.40 
Oscar K. Allen served as Governor of Louisiana from 1932 to 1936, 
following Huey Long’s term. Allen was a boyhood friend of Long, and 
Long appointed him as the head of the Highway Commission early in 
Long’s gubernatorial term.41 Long later handpicked Allen to run for 
governor after him.42 As noted by both White and Williams, Allen’s only 
qualification for governor consisted of his obedience to Huey Long.43 Earl 
K. Long, commenting on Allen’s willingness to do Huey Long’s bidding, 
stated that if “[a] leaf blew in the window of Allen’s office and fell on his 
desk[,] [h]e signed it,” thinking that it was something from Huey that 
needed approval.44 Later, Allen was elected to the United States Senate 
after Long’s death, but suffered a brain hemorrhage and died in the 
governor’s mansion on January 25, 1936.45 
36. See Articles of Incorporation of Win or Lose Corporation 3–5 (Nov. 21,
1934) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
37. See Interview by Michael Gillette with Earle J. Christenberry (Nov. 4,
1970), in Jack B. McGuire Papers, within DAVID R. MCGUIRE MEMORIAL 
COLLECTION. The interview can be located in the Manuscript Collections 271, 
Series 4, Box 1, Folder 34 in the Louisiana Research Collection of the Howard-
Tilton Memorial Library at Tulane University. 
38. See HAIR, supra note 13, at 279–80.
39. Long’s only term as governor ended on January 25, 1932.
40. WHITE, supra note 12, at 135.
41. Id. at 41, 102.
42. Id. at 135–36.
43. See generally WHITE, supra note 12; WILLIAMS, supra note 8.
44. HAIR, supra note 13, at 240.
45. WHITE, supra note 12, at 304.
2017] THE KINGFISH’S MINERAL LEGACY 81 
C. James A. Noe 
James A. Noe, though raised in Indiana, moved to Monroe, Louisiana, 
and established himself as a prominent oilman, politician, and one of the 
primary financial backers of Huey P. Long.46 Further, Noe was also the 
primary shareholder in and one of the founders of the Win or Lose 
Corporation. 
Noe was working as a drilling supervisor when he met Long, who was 
an attorney representing an injured worker at the time.47 The two instantly 
connected, bonding over a similar background and upbringing. In 1932, 
Long persuaded Noe to run for Louisiana State Senator. After he won, Noe 
was immediately appointed President Pro Tempore of the Senate.48 Later 
in 1934, Noe was appointed Lieutenant Governor of Louisiana at Long’s 
request.49 
When Governor Allen suffered a brain hemorrhage, Noe, then 
Lieutenant Governor, became governor, albeit only for a fourteen-week 
lame duck governorship.50 During his brief tenure as governor, Noe made 
several shrewd political decisions that would help him later in his career, 
but otherwise did nothing politically of note. It was during this brief time, 
however, that Noe granted the several mineral leases to William T. Burton 
that are the subject of this article. Importantly, despite the fact that 
Governor Noe actually granted the leases to W.T. Burton, application for 
those leases was made during Governor Allen’s tenure. This made Noe’s 
involvement in the actual leasing largely ministerial.51 
Although Noe attempted to break back into politics on a few more 
occasions, the remainder of his life was largely focused on his business 
interests, which included oil and gas assets—some of which derived from 
his association with Win or Lose—and media assets. Noe ultimately died 
in 1976. 
46. McManus, supra, note 10.
47. McManus, supra note 10, at 10.
48. Id. at 11.
49. Id. at 12.
50. See Lame Duck, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). “Lame duck”
is defined as “[a]n official, esp[ecially] an elected one, whose power has waned 
because his or her term of office will end soon; esp[ecially], an elected official serving 
out a term after a successor has been elected.” This is an appropriate characterization 
of James Noe’s governorship, as he was finishing Oscar Allen’s soon-ending term and 
he had not been elected to the position in his own right. 
51. See A.J. Gray, III, Annotation, An Analysis of the Legality and Viability of
Mineral Leases Granted to W.T. Burton and James A. Noe During the Years 1934–
1936, at 14–15 (2015) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Gray Annotation]. 
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D. William T. Burton 
William Thomas Burton, more commonly referred to as W.T. Burton, 
was a self-made businessman who started with a grocery store in Sulphur, 
Louisiana. Later, he became one of the most successful industrialists and 
philanthropists of Calcasieu Parish.52 He was chairman of the Calcasieu 
Marine National Bank and president of William T. Burton Industries of 
Sulphur—a company focused on oil and mineral investments.53 For the 
purposes of this article, Burton was also involved with the Win or Lose 
Corporation by leasing land from the State for mineral exploration and 
production, and then assigning54 substantial interests in those leases to the 
Win or Lose Corporation.55 Based upon the documents available at this 
time, it does not appear, nor has any new evidence been identified to 
suggest, that Burton was a stockholder in the Win or Lose Corporation.56 
52. ERBON W. WISE, BRIMSTONE!: THE HISTORY OF SULPHUR, LOUISIANA,
1878–1980, 107 (Southwest Builder News 1981). 
53. KATHIE BORDELON, MCNEESE STATE UNIVERSITY, 18 (Arcadia Publ’g
2001). 
54. An “assignment” in this context is defined as, “a transfer of rights in real
or personal property or rights under a contract—for example, the transfer of an oil 
and gas lease from the original lessee to others.” UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, 
PETROLEUM EXTENSION SERV., A DICTIONARY FOR THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 
13 (1st ed.) (Susan Toalson ed., 2005). See also HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & 
CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 30 (4th ed.) (Matthew 
Bender 1976). 
55. It is important to note that, contrary to some media allegations suggesting
that Burton was new to mineral leasing at the time of the Win or Lose Corporation 
activities that are the subject of this report, mineral activities were merely another 
part of Burton’s industrial pursuits. His activities in this area long predated the 
Win or Lose Corporation. See Zurik one, supra note 3, at 1 (stating, incorrectly, 
that Burton was “a Lake Charles businessman with little to no experience in 
drilling oil.”). In fact, Burton first acquired a mineral lease from the State in 1920 
(State Lease 42), which was fourteen years before the Win or Lose Corporation 
was even formed. See State Lease 42 (Oct. 20, 1920) (awarding the lease to Burton 
under authority of Governor John M. Parker) (on file with the La. Dep’t of 
Justice). When asked this question during the U.S. v. Noe trial in 1942, Burton 
noted that he had been in the oil business “ever since–the Spindle top . . . maybe 
thirty-five years or better.” United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8, at 
186 (citing testimony of William T. Burton). It is also important to note that 
Burton did not always prevail when he was a bidder on State mineral leases. In 
fact, one example of such an unsuccessful bid occurred during the Noe 
administration, where Burton was outbid by Shell on a lease at the same lease sale 
as State Lease 340. Shell High Bidder on State Lease, OIL NEWS OF THE 
SOUTHWEST (Feb. 20, 1936). See also Gray Annotation, supra note 51, at 10. 
56. See Articles of Incorporation of Win or Lose Corporation 3 (Nov. 21, 1934)
(on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). This supposition is corroborated by A.J. Gray, 
III, an attorney to W.T. Burton. See Gray Annotation, supra note 51, at 16. 
2017] THE KINGFISH’S MINERAL LEGACY 83 
Few of the major political biographies or monographs related to 
Louisiana even mention Burton. He seems to have kept a low profile, as 
he never ran for political office nor was he directly involved in Louisiana 
politics. Although Burton was on the receiving end of two Internal 
Revenue Service tax evasion trials and an additional trial for jury 
tampering, the latter of which garnered him a two-year stint in the 
penitentiary,57 he is fondly remembered in his home, Calcasieu Parish. 
Indeed, several buildings at McNeese State University are named in his 
honor: The Burton Business Center and the Burton Coliseum.58 
Additionally, the William T. Burton and Ethel Lewis Burton Foundation 
award scholarships to outstanding, graduating high school students in the 
Lake Charles area.59 W.T. Burton died in 1974. 
E. Earle Christenberry 
Earle Christenberry was Huey Long’s private secretary and an 
influential man behind the scenes of the Huey Long administration and the 
subsequent Longite administrations.60 In a letter to J. Edgar Hoover, FBI 
Special Agent Sackett describes Christenberry as, “a very good student of 
Politics . . . a level-headed, capable young man.”61 Because Christenberry 
largely operated in the background of other prominent individuals, little 
biographical information is available; however, it is known that he was 
born in New Orleans and grew up in a working class family.62 Further, his 
brother, Herbert W. Christenberry, served as a judge in the federal court 
for the Eastern District of Louisiana from 1949 to 1975.63 Earle 
Christenberry faded from public view not long after Long’s death. 
Nonetheless, Earle Christenberry lived until 1980. 
F.  Seymour Weiss 
Seymour Weiss was a prominent New Orleans businessman, a 
manager turned owner of the fabled Roosevelt Hotel, and one of Huey 
57. 19-Year-Old Tax Dispute Settled, William T. Burton to Pay U.S.
$635,000, TIMES-PICAYUNE 1 (Nov. 16, 1954). 
58. BORDELON, supra note 53, at 19.
59. WISE, supra note 52 at 107.
60. Letter from B.E. Sackett, Special Agent, to J. Edgar Hoover, FBI Director
(May 22, 1939) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
61. Id. at 2.
62. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, History of the Federal Judiciary:
Biographies: Herbert W. Christenberry, https://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page 
/tu_bush_bio _christenberry.html [https://perma.cc/KEG9-6623] (last accessed Oct. 
9, 2016). 
63. Id.
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Long’s closest confidants.64 Weiss was the treasurer for Huey Long’s 
campaign and was active behind the scenes of the Long administration.65 
In 1929, the Louisiana House of Representatives summoned Weiss to give 
testimony regarding certain expenditures that the anti-Long faction 
believed had been used by Huey Long for drinking and girls. Weiss, in a 
spectacular display of loyalty to Long, refused to answer any questions 
regarding the money.66 Weiss remained Long’s steadfast friend and 
business partner, sharing in the successes of the Win or Lose venture. 
Moreover, to illustrate how close the two were, Weiss was one of those at 
Long’s bedside when the latter died. Weiss died in 1969. 
II. HISTORIC CONTROVERSIES
The Win or Lose Corporation and the involvement of its officers or 
shareholders in various mineral leases from the State of Louisiana have 
been controversial virtually since the corporation’s inception. This section 
reviews both the legal disputes related to these matters as well as the 
media’s historial treatment of these issues. 
A. Review of All Known Legal Cases Filed, Their Outcomes, and Their 
Impact on any Current or Future Action. 
A total of seven lawsuits were identified as having been filed related 
to one or more of the matters surrounding the Win or Lose Corporation. 
Only one such case, Roussel v. Noe, to be discussed below, actually 
focused on the issues involved in this article, but the other suits, save one, 
are contextually relevant.67 
1. State v. Noe (La. 19th J.D.C. 1936) (No. 11,112)
In State v. Noe, a writ of mandamus was brought seeking an order 
directing then-Governor James A. Noe to cancel State Lease 335, which 
was issued by Governor Oscar K. Allen to W.T. Burton on January 23, 
1936.68 This suit was brought by the Land Investment Company, Inc. on 
March 27, 1936, who alleged that former Governor Allen unlawfully 
64. WHITE, supra note 12, at 80.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 81.
67. The one suit tangentially related to this matter, but of no substantive
importance, is the matter of Daspit v. State (La. 19th J.D.C. 1954) (No. 23,833) (on 
file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). This was a case regarding payment of certain 
attorneys from an earlier case related to this matter and is not reviewed here. 
68. See Petition of State ex rel. Land Inv. Co., Inc., State v. Noe (La. 19th
J.D.C. 1936) (No. 11,112) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
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ignored its nomination of certain acreage to be advertised for bidding.69 
This same acreage later made up a small portion of a nomination by W.T. 
Burton. In its Petition, the State acknowledged that Governor Allen 
advertised Burton’s nomination for bidding and that Burton ultimately 
submitted the winning bid.70 This nominated area became State Lease 335. 
Land Investment Company, Inc. alleged injury due to Governor Allen’s 
failure to advertise the acreage for bidding upon its application because, 
although Burton’s nomination included the same area, it was for such a 
large swath of land that Land Investment Company, Inc. was financially 
unable to bid.71 Following the filing of this litigation, minimal activity 
occurred in the court record—the filing of exceptions and answers. The 
case eventually settled on May 28, 1936, and a judgment approving the 
compromise was entered on June 1, 1936.72 However, no copy of the 
settlement exists in the court record or in the State lease record.73 
This case does not have a res judicata effect on any theory that the 
State or a private party might use to challenge this lease today. However, 
it is important to note that a review of the law in force at the time that State 
Lease 335 was issued reveals that, had this matter gone to trial on the 
mandamus issue, it would have failed. The mandamus relief sought in this 
matter assumes that Governor Allen was legally obligated to advertise any 
nomination of State property for mineral leasing. If this were the case, as 
a mandatory and ministerial (i.e., nondiscretionary) act, Allen was 
required to advertise the acreage nominated by Land Investment 
Company, Inc., upon its application on July 3, 1935. Following this 
argument to its end, Allen’s failure to advertise Land Investment 
Company, Inc.’s nomination allowed W.T. Burton to later nominate the 
same property—albeit as part of a much larger nomination—bid on it, and 
69. Id. ¶ 4.
70. Id. ¶ 7.
71. Id. ¶¶ 8–9.
72. Judgment, ¶ 2, State v. Noe (La. 19th J.D.C. 1936) (No. 11,112) (on file
with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
73. Commenting on the outcome of this litigation, an attorney for W.T.
Burton, A.J. Gray, III, stated: 
The Minutes of a meeting of Win or Lose Corporation dated May 28, 
1936 . . . reflect that the compromise with Land Investment Company, 
Inc. was for payment to Land Investment Company, Inc. of $5,000.00 
plus a 1/48th overriding royalty under State Lease 335. According to the 
minutes, the 1/48th overriding royalty was one-half of the 1/24th 
overriding royalty Burton reserved in his sublease of State Lease 335 to 
The Texas Company. According to the minutes, Burton and The Texas 
Company agreed to pay the $5,000.00, and Burton agreed to convey 
1/8th of the 1/24th overriding royalty while Win or Lose Corporation 
agreed to convey 3/8th of the 1/24th overriding royalty. 
Gray Annotation, supra note 51, at 20–21. 
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receive the State lease for the property. However, the law in force at the 
time of this activity—Acts 1915, No. 3074—specifically makes the 
advertisement for bidding of any nominated property discretionary for the 
governor.75 The discretionary authority of an elected official cannot be 
compelled by way of mandamus.76 Thus, although Governor Allen failed 
to exercise his discretion to advertise Land Investment Company, Inc.’s 
nomination for what became State Lease 335, Governor Noe had no 
obligation to cancel that lease. 
For this reason, while this case is instructive on the question of 
whether governors in the 1930s had the discretion to or not act on certain 
nominations, it is not an indictment of the letting of State Lease 335. Based 
on Governor Allen’s statutory authority at the time, he was authorized to 
reject nominations and could not be compelled to advertise each 
nomination for bid. 
2. State v. Noe (La. 19th J.D.C. 1936) (No. 11,126)
This case involved another mandamus proceeding against then-
Governor James A. Noe by a losing bidder for State Lease 321. State Lease 
321 was granted on January 23, 1936 by then-Governor Oscar K. Allen to 
W.T. Burton. The problem alleged in this action was that when the original 
lease was issued, it was not properly advertised.77 Although the lease was 
advertised in other parishes, it was not advertised in the official journal of 
the parish in which the land was situated, Caddo Parish.78 As a result, the 
lease, subsequent to its issuance, was properly readvertised. The 
complaining party in this case, C.M. Brenner, alleged that his bid, 
submitted pursuant to the advertised lease term—one year—was more 
advantageous to the State than Burton’s bid for a two-year term.79 Further, 
74. As amended by Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 606-07 and Act No. 9, 1930
La. Acts 27 (passed by the 1928 Extraordinary Legislative Session) (currently LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:126 (2009)). 
75. This reality is so because of the “may” language in the following excerpt:
[T]he Governor of the State may cause the Register of the State Land 
Office to make an inspection of the land sought to be leased, and . . . . 
the Governor may cause to be published in the official journal of the state 
. . . a description of the land to be leased [by the State] . . . . 
Act No. 30, § 3, 1915 La. Acts 62 (emphasis added). 
76. Badger v. City of New Orleans, 21 So. 870, 872 (La. 1897) (“The mandamus
issues only to enforce the purely ministerial duty imposed by law.”); see also Cook v. 
City of Shreveport, 112 So. 402, 404 (La. 1927); State ex rel. City of New Orleans v. 
La. Highway Comm’n, 156 So. 806, 810 (La. 1934). 
77. See Petition of State ex rel. C.M. Brenner, ¶ 3, State v. Noe (La. 19th
J.D.C. 1936) (No. 11,126) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
78. Id.
79. Id. at ¶¶ 6–9.
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Brenner alleged that because the advertisement sought a bid for a one-year 
term and Burton’s bid was for a two-year term, he had submitted the only 
bid in conformity with the advertisement and therefore, the lease should 
have been awarded to him.80 
This matter reached the Louisiana Supreme Court in State ex rel. 
Brenner v. Noe.81 Nevertheless, the court did not rule on whether an 
acceptance of a two-year lease is legally permissible when the actual 
advertisement only called for a one-year lease. Thus, this question remains 
unresolved as to this lease. Regardless, State Lease 321 is no longer active, 
hence making any further inquiry into the validity of the lease moot. 
Further, as the Louisiana Supreme Court has noted: 
[a]s the obligations of the lessee have been fully complied with 
under the terms of the lease, the lease has become an executed 
contract. The State has accepted the benefits of the lease for 
several years in receiving the sum of $500, paid by the lessee as 
bonus and rentals, and neither law, equity nor good conscience 
will allow the State to claim the benefits and at the same time 
escape its obligations under the lease.82 
In other words, because the State accepted the benefits of this lease 
during its existence, the State cannot later challenge the same lease for 
irregularities in the advertisements of the lease. This is an important 
problem for any current challenges to any Win or Lose leases, as the State 
has undoubtedly accepted the benefits—such as royalties—from all of the 
Win or Lose leases. Accordingly, the passage of time and, more 
importantly, the acceptance of the benefits of the lease, have now 
effectively barred the State from challenging this lease based on the 
advertised lease term issue. 
3. United States v. Noe (E.D. La. 1942) (No. 20,070)
U.S. v. Noe involved a federal income tax evasion matter brought by the 
United States against James A. Noe, Seymour Weiss, and the Win or Lose 
Corporation.83 The federal government alleged that the named defendants 
had concealed certain income information in order to avoid the imposition 
of income taxes, and had thus violated and conspired to violate the Internal 
80. Id. at ¶ 10.
81. 171 So. 708 (La. 1936).
82. Reeves v. Leche, 195 So. 542, 545 (La. 1940). See also State ex rel. Shell Oil
Co. v. Register of the State Land Office, 192 So. 519, 520 (La. 1939). 
83. See United States v. Noe (E.D. La. 1942) (No. 20,070) (on file with the
La. Dep’t of Justice). 
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Revenue Code. On October 3, 1940, the court returned an indictment 
against the defendants, charging them with violations of the Internal 
Revenue Code.84 Following the indictment, the United States filed a 
criminal case against the defendants on October 8, 1940 in the Eastern 
District of Louisiana.85 Weiss, alone, pled guilty. The imposition of his 
sentence was suspended and Weiss was placed on probation for a period 
of five years. On the other hand, both, Noe and the Win or Lose 
Corporation pled not guilty. 
During the trial, Noe was questioned regarding certain deposits and 
payments made to the Win or Lose Corporation. To most of these 
questions, Noe responded that he had no recollection of specific 
transactions.86 He did provide that one payment to former Governor Allen 
was a gift rather than the payment of dividends.87 He also stated that 
former Governor Long was never issued any shares of stock in Win or 
Lose Corporation.88 Notably, both statements have proven to be incorrect, 
as was revealed by the testimony of various individuals in the 1942 trial.89 
Nonetheless, on April 11, 1942, a jury returned not guilty verdicts 
against Noe and Win or Lose on all four counts of attempted tax evasion.90 
Although this case is related to the Win or Lose Corporation, it provides 
no real legal insight into the matter being reviewed here, except to confirm 
certain facts. Further, it has no legal bearing on any claims that the State 
or a taxpaying plaintiff may have today in challenging any Win or Lose 
activities. 
4. State v. Burton (La. 14th J.D.C. 1944) (No. 22,664)
State v. Burton, filed on October 5, 1943 against W.T. Burton in 
Calcasieu Parish, challenged the validity of State Lease 318 and certain 
84. See Indictment, United States v. Noe (E.D. La. 1942) (No. 20,070), (Oct. 3,
1940) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
85. See id.
86. United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8, at 3–5 (citing sworn
statement of James A. Noe given on Nov. 4, 1937). 
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id. at 10–11. This same statement was made by Earle Christenberry some
thirty years later in a private interview. See Interview by Michael Gillette with Earle 
J. Christenberry (Nov. 4, 1970), in Jack B. McGuire Papers, within DAVID R. 
MCGUIRE MEMORIAL COLLECTION. The interview can be located in the Manuscript 
Collections 271, Series 4, Box 1, Folder 34 in the Louisiana Research Collection of 
the Howard-Tilton Memorial Library at Tulane University. 
89. See, e.g., United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8, at 165
(noting that Governor Allen held stock in Win or Lose Corporation). 
90. See Jury Verdict, United States v. Noe (E.D. La. 1942) (No. 20,070),
(Apr. 11, 1942) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
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actions related to that lease subsequent to its issuance.91 Specifically, the 
suit, filed by the State Mineral Board in the name of the State of Louisiana 
(the suit subsequently was amended to add the State Mineral Board as an 
actual co-plaintiff) alleged that: (1) certain assignments to The Texas 
Company and the Win or Lose Corporation were invalid for Win or Lose’s 
failure to record and pay consideration for those assignments;92 (2) those 
assignments were further invalid because then-Governor Oscar K. Allen, 
as a stockholder of the Win or Lose Corporation, received a benefit from 
the assignments;93 (3) the interests of The Texas Company and the Win or 
Lose Corporation were reassigned to Burton to avoid the necessity of 
paying delay rentals;94 (4) State Lease 318 was invalid because it did not 
contain a “reasonable development clause” but rather “unusual, 
unfavorable, inequitable, and unconscionable” terms for the State; thus, 
Burton’s bid should have been rejected;95 (5) State Lease 318 had, at that 
time, kept State land out of commerce for eight years—with an indefinite 
term—and it was illegal, null and void, and violative of the doctrine of 
ownership;96 (6) the consideration of less than seven cents per acre and the 
yearly rental of less than four cents per acre was inadequate, trifling, and 
constituted the legal equivalent of paying no consideration;97 (7) State 
Lease 318 was procured through conspiracy, favoritism, collusion, and 
fraud;98 (8) State Lease 318 was invalid because then-Governor Allen 
granted himself a 1/266th overriding royalty;99 and (9) State Lease 318 
was one of several similar fraudulent transactions by W.T. Burton.100 
Following six months of exceptions, amendments to the petition, and 
other legal maneuverings, the court issued its reasons for judgment on 
April 5, 1944. However, whether the court could determine the merits of 
the State and the Mineral Board’s arguments depended on two 
preliminary, procedural issues: 
1. [Whether] the State of Louisiana in an action in which it may
have an interest as a distinct entity apart from other entities or 
91. State v. Burton (La. 14th J.D.C. 1944) (No. 22,664) (on file with the La. Dep’t
of Justice). 
92. See Petition of State, ¶¶ 6–8, State v. Burton (La. 14th J.D.C. 1944) (No.
22,664) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
93. Id. ¶¶ 11–13.
94. Id. ¶¶ 14–15.
95. Id. ¶¶ 17–18.
96. Id. ¶ 19.
97. Id. ¶ 20.
98. Petition of State, ¶ 20, State v. Burton (La. 14th J.D.C. 1944) (No. 22,664)
(on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
99. Id. ¶ 25.
100. Id. ¶ 27. 
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corporate agencies it may create and in its own name and 
sovereign capacity have the legal right or capacity under our law 
to institute and maintain such action represented therein by and 
through some person or agency of the State other than the 
Attorney General as the legal representative of the State. 
2. [Whether] the State of Louisiana as plaintiff in this suit have
any legal right or authority under our law to institute and maintain 
this suit in the name of the State Mineral Board, or by any 
supplemental pleadings implead or make the State Mineral Board 
a co-plaintiff in the suit, even though it be alleged in such 
supplemental and amended pleadings that the State Mineral Board 
through its special counsel consents to being made a party plaintiff 
with the State of Louisiana.101 
In deciding these two preliminary issues, the court found in favor of 
W.T. Burton and against both the State and the Louisiana Mineral Board. 
It held that: 
Since, therefore, this Court has already concluded that the State of 
Louisiana as the plaintiff in the main or original suit is without 
right or cause of action to institute this suit brought by and 
represented therein by an individual or agency other than the 
Attorney General and must be dismissed, it naturally follows that 
this intervention, if it may be called such, must be dismissed, 
without prejudice, however, to the right of the State Mineral Board 
to asserts its rights in a separate action.102 
Moreover, the court found that the State of Louisiana did not have the 
authority to institute the suit by an individual or agency other than the 
Attorney General and that the later joinder of the State Mineral Board as 
an additional party plaintiff did not correct that error.103 
The record reflects that the State parties filed an appeal after losing. 
However, the appeal was jointly dismissed by the parties, stating that, “the 
State Mineral Board has formally recognized the validity of [Lease 318] 
and all of the differences existing between [the parties] concerning said 
lease have been compromised and adjusted and the subject matter of said 
litigation has, consequently, become moot.”104 
 101. Reasons for Judgment at 8–9, State v. Burton (La. 14th J.D.C. 1944) (No. 
22,664) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
102. Id. at 18–19. 
103. Id. at 17–18. 
104. Joint Motion for Dismissal of Appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellants, ¶ 2, State 
v. Burton (La. 1944) (No. 37,524) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice).
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Ultimately, there was no ruling on the merits by a court as to the 
validity of State Lease 318, the assignments of that lease to Win or Lose 
Corporation, or any of the other substantive matters of interest to the 
current review. Also, because this case was dismissed on procedural 
grounds only, it does not have a res judicata binding effect on the State or 
a taxpayer plaintiff as to the possible litigation of these matters today.105 
However, because the State Mineral Board and/or State “recognized the 
validity of Lease 318,”106 it is reasonably likely that this apparent 
ratification undermines the ability of the State to bring a challenge to this 
lease today for leasing inconsistencies.107 In addition, the State’s 
acceptance of the benefits of this lease subsequent to this settlement would 
now, under State ex rel. Shell Oil Co., Inc. v. Register of State Land 
Office,108 undermine the State’s ability to challenge the lease or the 
settlement. 
5. State v. Grace (La. 19th J.D.C. 1945) (No. 21,076)
In State v. Grace, filed on February 4, 1944, the State and the State 
Mineral Board brought an action against the Register of State Lands, 
Lucille May Grace, Independent Oil & Gas Corporation, Morris S. 
Rhoads, John A. Farrell, and D.J. Simmons seeking a declaration that State 
Lease 309 was invalid.109 State Lease 309 was granted to James A. Noe on 
October 23, 1934, which was during the gubernatorial term of Oscar K. 
Allen (and prior to Allen’s death).110 The basis of the original claim was 
that, because no cash bonus was paid to the State for State Lease 309, the 
real consideration for the lease was the lessee’s obligation to drill fifty 
wells within the primary term.111 According to the Petition, after the 
completion of only four wells, on August 21, 1935, the Register of the 
State Land Office cancelled and changed the terms of the lease to require 
 105. See, e.g., Perrin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 248 So.2d 58, 60 (La. 
App. 1 Cir. 1971) (noting that a dismissal of a suit on procedural grounds alone 
cannot be said to have a res judicata effect on the merits of the matter if brought 
in a later suit). 
 106. Interestingly, A.J. Gray, III, has commented that the settlement of this suit 
during the pendency of the appeal that was ultimately dismissed also resulted in a 
“ratification of State Lease 340.” Gray Annotation, supra note 51, at 29. However, 
Mr. Gray did not provide any supporting documents for this assertion. 
 107. It should be noted that this lease no longer exists. The final release on 
State Lease 318 occurred in 1975. 
108. 192 So. 519 (La. 1939). 
 109. State v. Grace (La. 19th J.D.C. 1945) (No. 21,076) (on file with the La. 
Dep’t of Justice). 
110. See Petition of State, ¶¶ 5–6, State v. Grace (La. 19th J.D.C. 1945) (No. 
21,076) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
111. Id. ¶ 11. 
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only thirty wells, instead of fifty.112 The State alleged that such a change 
constituted the Register acting beyond her authority to the prejudice of the 
State.113 
On July 6, 1944, the State amended its petition, alleging that State 
Leases 494 and 495, which also covered areas within State Lease 309, 
were invalid because they were issued pursuant to Acts 1940, No. 47, 
which had been declared unconstitutional.114 Following this action, some 
discovery was undertaken and answers were filed. In April of 1945, both 
the State Mineral Board and the board of Independent Oil & Gas Co., Inc. 
passed resolutions authorizing a settlement of this litigation.115 
On May 2, 1945, the parties executed an agreement to settle and 
compromise the lawsuit, with the private defendants paying the State the 
sum of $10,000, as well as surrendering and releasing the property 
described in State Lease 309.116 In exchange, the State agreed to ratify 
State Lease 309, as amended by the Register on August 21, 1935, and to 
dismiss its claims.117 On May 11, 1945, the court entered a judgment 
dismissing the matter pursuant to the settlement among the parties.118 
Accordingly, pursuant to this settlement and judgment: (1) State Lease 309 
was recognized as a valid mineral lease between the State of Louisiana and 
then Independent Oil & Gas Co., Farrell, Rhoads, and Simmons; (2) the 
demands against Interstate Natural Gas Company and United Gas Public 
Service Company were rejected and dismissed; and (3) the State received 
a judgment in its favor in the amount of $10,000.119 
The practical impact of this case is likely significant for the current 
inquiry: this settlement and judgment most likely creates a situation where 
the validity and viability of these leases, once called into question by the 
State and the State Mineral Board, were settled and the judgment entered 
by the court now has a res judicata effect on the State’s ability to challenge 
112. Id. ¶ 14. 
113. Id. ¶ 18. 
114. Second Amended Petition of State, ¶ 2, State v. Grace (La. 19th J.D.C. 
1945) (No. 21,076) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
 115. The relevant resolutions accompany the suit’s settlement documents in 
the public records of the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources associated 
with State Leases 494 and 495. 
 116. Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6(a)-(b), State v. Grace (La. 19th J.D.C. 1945) 
(No. 21,076) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
117. Id. ¶ 6(d). 
 118. Judgment, at 1–2, State v. Grace (La. 19th J.D.C. 1945) (No. 21,076) 
(rendered on May 11, 1945) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
119. Id. at 2. 
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these leases.120 For this reason, the involvement of James A. Noe, Win or 
Lose Corporation, or Independent Oil and Gas Company, Inc., as to State 
Leases 309, 494, and 495 is considered no further. Pursuant to the 
settlement and judgment, the State ratified the complained-of activities 
and was compensated for its perceived losses.121 Effectively, the State has 
been made whole with regard to these leases, regardless of a finding of 
wrongdoing by the court. 
6. Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42,338); 274 So.2d
205 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1973) 
On July 27, 1971, Louis J. Roussel, Jr. filed a class action suit in St. 
Mary Parish against two defendants: former Governor James A. Noe, 
individually, and the State Mineral Board of the State of Louisiana.122 
Roussel alleged that Noe conspired to utilize his position of trust to obtain 
mineral interests in State properties, namely State Leases 340 and 341.123 
According to Roussel, the conspiracy was confected through the creation 
of the Win or Lose Corporation.124 Although by the time of Roussel’s suit 
in the 1970s, the Win or Lose Corporation—which later changed its name 
to Independent Oil & Gas Company, Inc.—had been liquidated, Roussel 
alleged that many of the individual stockholders that gained an interest 
upon liquidation benefitted from Noe’s actions in the awarding of certain 
State leases and assignments.125 Roussel sought to have the leases declared 
 120. It is not possible to foreclose the ability of the State to raise today matters 
somewhat related (though not the same) as the issues settled in this case. Such a 
situation would be dependent upon the similarity of the claims today and the 
claims in the 1944 litigation. The basic precepts underlying this qualification are 
the requirements of the exception of res judicata. As Maraist and Lemmon have 
noted, “res judicata is applicable to ‘all causes of action existing at the time of 
final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the litigation.’” FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6:7, in 1 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed.). Thus, under LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 
927(A)(3), in order for res judicata to apply to a matter, the claims must arise out 
of the same “transaction or occurrence” that was the subject of the original case. 
It is difficult to conceive of a scenario in which the State would be able to assert 
claims not originally raised or able to be raised in the original suit, thus making a 
viable cause of action as to these leases after the 1944 litigation unlikely. 
 121. A very rough calculation of the inflationary value of this $10,000.00 
figure from 1945 in 2016 dollars is $134,126.67. CPI Inflation Calculator, 
BUREAU LAB. STAT., data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. 
 122. See Petition of Louis J. Roussel, ¶ 55, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 
1980) (No. 42,338) (original petition filed on July 27, 1971) (on file with the La. 
Dep’t of Justice). The putative class members were all Louisiana taxpayers. 
123. Id. ¶¶ 11, 24–25. 
124. Id. ¶¶ 32, 46. 
125. Id. ¶¶ 42–43. 
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null and void, and to require an accounting and reimbursement to the 
State.126 
Roussel brought his action based upon his alleged standing as a 
Louisiana taxpayer.127 On August 26, 1971, the district court ruled that 
Roussel, as a taxpayer, had no standing to bring such an action, and that 
the Attorney General was the only party empowered to bring such a suit.128 
The court further ruled that, because Roussel’s suit would necessarily 
impact the rights of those that had acquired interests in the subject leases 
by way of assignment, all of the assignees of the challenged leases were 
necessary parties to the litigation.129 These rulings led to a dismissal of 
Roussel’s suit by the district court on August 31, 1971.130 
Following the district court’s dismissal of Roussel’s suit on 
exceptions, Roussel appealed to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of 
Appeal. On review, in Roussel v. Noe, the first circuit affirmed the district 
court’s rejection of the class action nature of Roussel’s suit.131 However, 
the court did find that Roussel was “entitled to proceed as an individual 
taxpayer.”132 The court further stated that, “the Attorney General may 
intervene [in Roussel’s suit] if he so desires and assert . . . whatever 
position his judgment dictates is the proper one for the State of 
Louisiana.”133 This judgment effectively revived Roussel’s suit. 
The first circuit went on to declare that the State Mineral Board had 
been improperly joined in the suit against Noe.134 The reason for this ruling 
was that the action against the State Mineral Board was a mandamus action 
seeking the cancellation of the challenged leases. Such a summary 
proceeding cannot be cumulated with an ordinary proceeding; thus, the 
two causes of action against Noe could not survive together as one suit. 
Noting that “[m]andamus does not lie to compel the performance of a 
discretionary act[,]”135 the first circuit effectively severed the State 
Mineral Board as a defendant (and upheld its dismissal in the district court) 
in the continued prosecution of Roussel’s case. It stated that “[t]he State 
Mineral Board cannot be said to have failed to perform its ministerial duty 
126. Id. ¶ 55. 
127. Id. ¶ 1–2. 
128. See Reasons for Rulings on Exceptions, at 1–2, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th 
J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42,338) (filed on Aug. 27, 1971) (on file with the La. Dep’t of 
Justice). 
129. Id. at 3. 
 130. See Judgment, at 1, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42,338) 
(signed on Aug. 31, 1971) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
131. 274 So.2d 205 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1973). 
132. Id. at 209. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 212–13. 
135. Id. at 213. 
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until such time as plaintiff has successfully invalidated Noe’s and others’ 
interests in and to the royalties emanating from the subject leases.”136 Yet, 
Roussel had not proven that any of the challenged leases had been 
improperly granted. Thus, no mandatory duty on the part of the State 
Mineral Board to cancel the leases could exist to which a mandamus action 
could attach. Further, even if such a duty was later found, such an action 
could not be brought as part of an ordinary proceeding, as mandamus 
actions employ a separate procedure.137 Thus, any such demand would 
have to be brought later in a separate lawsuit. 
Finally, the first circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that parties 
holding interests in the leases by way of assignment must be joined as 
parties to the lawsuit.138 Thus, in order to continue this action, Roussel was 
required to add as defendant parties numerous other interest holders in the 
leases. 
On remand, Roussel continued the prosecution of his case. To begin, 
Roussel amended his petition to join multiple defendants that claimed an 
interest in State Leases 340 and 341.139 Among the newly named 
defendants was the State of Louisiana, represented by the State Mineral 
Board.140 Roussel again amended his petition on April 29, 1974, to add 
additional defendants with interests in the subject leases.141 
Once again, the State and the State Mineral Board were dismissed 
from the litigation on exceptions of no right of action.142 Although The 
Texas Company was also dismissed under a no cause exception,143 the 
remaining defendants were not dismissed, thus allowing the suit to 
continue.144 
136. Id. 
 137. FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.3, in 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE (2d ed.). 
138. Roussel v. Noe, 274 So.2d 205, 211 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1973). 
139. Amended Petition of Louis J. Roussel, ¶ 8, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 
1980) (No. 42,338) (filed on Sept. 18, 1973) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
140. Id. 
 141. See Supplemental and Amending Petition of Louis J. Roussel, ¶ 8, 
Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42,338) (filed on Apr. 29, 1974) (on 
file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
142. Reasons for Judgment, at 5–6, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 
42,338) (rendered on May 11, 1977) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
143. Id. at 4. 
 144. See Judgment on Dilatory Exceptions of Vagueness, Roussel v. Noe (La. 
16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42, 338) (rendered on August 2, 1977) (on file with the 
La. Dep’t of Justice); Judgement on Dilatory Exceptions of Lack of Procedural 
Capacity, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42, 338) (rendered on 
August 2, 1977) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
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The next significant activity came on November 21, 1979, when the 
remaining defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting the 
following: 
A) The state mineral leases involved in this case were issued in
accordance with the law in effect at the time and neither fraud nor 
conspiracy was involved.145 
B) During the relevant period of time, there was no prohibition
against defendants or their respective ancestors in the title 
acquiring an interest in mineral leases.146 
C)The release and compromise agreements between the State
Mineral Board, The Texas Company, Mr. Burton, and Win or 
Lose Corporation (Independent Oil and Gas Company, Inc.) in 
1943 bar prosecution of this suit by Plaintiff as representative of 
the State of Louisiana.147 
D) Prosecution of this suit is barred by the well recognized and
judicially accepted principle [of] doctrine of estoppel.148 
Inexplicably at the time, Roussel did not respond to the remaining 
defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the court issued 
Reasons for Judgment on May 7, 1980, noting that the plaintiff’s failure 
to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment required a dismissal of 
the suit, and a Judgment was entered to that effect on June 16, 1980.149 
Because of Roussel’s failure to respond to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed in 1979, there was no consideration of the merits of his 
claims. This oddity was definitively answered when Roussel published his 
memoirs in 1997.150 In his book, Roussel stated that he did not respond to 
the Motion for Summary Judgment and that he otherwise let the case 
against State Leases 340 and 341 lapse because of his friendships with 
 145. Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, at 46, 
Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42,338) (filed on Nov. 21, 1979) (on 
file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
146. Id. at 51. 
147. Id. at 54. 
148. Id. at 60. 
149. Reasons for Judgment, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42, 338) 
(filed on May 7, 1980) (on file with author); Order and Judgment, Roussel v. Noe (La. 
16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42, 338) (filed June 16, 1980) (on file with author). 
 150. See generally LOUIS J. ROUSSEL, JR., FRIENDS, ENEMIES & VICTIMS: THE 
PERSONAL SUCCESS OF A SEVENTH-GRADER, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LOUIS J. 
ROUSSEL, JR. (Sheree Kerner ed., 1997). 
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Earle Christenberry and Seymour Weiss.151 Thus, Roussel’s personal 
decision explains why there is no substantive ruling on his allegations.152 
An interesting effect of the Roussel suit was that then-Attorney 
General William Guste filed a substantive brief summarizing the history 
of the Win or Lose Corporation investigations by the Office of the 
Attorney General.153 This brief assessed the chances of the success of such 
a suit on the merits, looking at the customs of the time and at the available 
evidence. In this regard, Guste stated that, “this investigation, to date, has 
produced no legally admissible evidence of fraud.”154 Further, Guste 
provided that: 
At the time of the execution of mineral leases 340 and 341, by the 
defendant, then Governor, there was no statute prohibiting him 
from owning stock in a corporation securing oil or gas rights under 
a State lease granted to another by him. Nor was there a statute 
which prohibited the governor or any public official from directly 
bidding for, and as high bidder, securing State mineral leases.155 
Thus, when this issue was before the courts in the 1970s—more than 
thirty years closer in time to the events that are the subject of this article—
the Attorney General could find neither a factual nor a legal basis to 
support Roussel’s allegations. 
Although the Attorney General participated in this matter, his 
involvement as an amicus, in addition to the State’s peripheral 
involvement in the case as a party defendant, does not preclude the State 
from bringing an action on these same questions today. However, the 
above accounts, which are statements of record from the State’s chief legal 
officer at the time, would likely constitute substantial statements against 
151. Id. at 89. 
 152. This point is important to note, as, in his autobiography, Roussel notes that 
“[t]he suit, accusing the six of cheating the state out of $250 million was valid and was 
sent to a state court for trial.” Id. With this statement, Roussel implies that the first 
circuit had substantively ruled on his allegations. It did not. As discussed, the first 
circuit merely ruled on exceptions and allowed the merits of the case to go forward. 
There was no substantive decision in this case. The “six” that Roussel referred to in 
the above quote are: Huey P. Long, Oscar K. Allen, James A. Noe, Earle J. 
Christenberry, Seymour Weiss, and Alice L. Grosjean. Id. at 87. 
153. Brief for State of Louisiana as Amici Curiae, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th 
J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42,338), (Nov. 15, 1973) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
 154. Brief for State of Louisiana as Amici Curiae at 8, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th 
J.D.C. 1980) (No. 42,338), (Nov. 15, 1973) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
155. Id. at ¶ XXIX. 
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interest should an action be brought.156 Such statements against interest 
would create a substantial evidentiary difficulty for the State in any 
present-day litigation. Importantly, as has been noted by Gray, this case 
represented the first and last time that all living parties to the allegedly 
corrupt mineral leases were available.157 Many of these individuals were 
interviewed or deposed by the parties to the litigation without any 
“smoking gun” to the allegations that have lingered around these leases 
for so long being identified.158 Interestingly, should private parties 
ultimately find merit in Roussel’s claims and be able to remedy what most 
parties in the 1970s recognized as a substantial lack of evidence, Roussel’s 
case certainly stands for the proposition that a private party may maintain 
such an action. 
7. Summary of the Win or Lose Cases
Although these cases are useful for providing a historical background 
to the Win or Lose matter, they resulted in little, if any, substantive 
examination of the actual allegations that Huey P. Long or his colleagues 
swindled the State through the Win or Lose Corporation’s actions. The 
Roussel case came the closest to substantively addressing these issues. 
However, because that case never advanced past the procedural stages, 
there was no definitive outcome. As can be seen throughout this article, 
the U.S. v. Noe matter, though largely unrelated to the Win or Lose issues 
(i.e., it was a tax evasion case) sheds, through the trial transcript, 
considerable light on the history and motives of the individuals involved 
in the Win or Lose matter. With these two exceptions noted, the previous 
litigation related to the Win or Lose leases is largely uninstructive with 
respect to the issues currently raised. Further, these cases would likely not 
 156. With regard to a statement against interest, we here refer to that evidentiary 
exception to the hearsay rule which Maraist, et al., has described thusly: 
Under the Louisiana rule, the statement at the time it was made must have 
been ‘so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or 
so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid 
a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would 
not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.’ 
FRANK L. MARAIST, EVIDENCE AND PROOF § 10.8, in 19 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE (2d ed.). 
 157. Gray Annotation, supra note 51, at 39. By way of reference, Gray lists the 
following individuals who were interviewed in some form or fashion during the 
course of the Roussel litigation: W.T. Burton; Carl Campbell (former State Land 
Office employee); Earle J. Christenberry; Dudley G. Couvillon (former SMB 
Secretary); William A. Romans (former SMB employee); Alice Lee Grosjean Tharpe; 
George A. Wilson (former Department of Minerals attorney); C.C. Wood (former 
Special Assistant to Attorney General Eugene Stanley). Id. at 39–45. 
158. Id. at 39. 
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control any potential action that the State or a private party may attempt to 
institute against the current Win or Lose interests. Due to the lack of 
guidance from these cases, the current analysis herein reviews all of the 
issues anew. 
B. Historic Attorney General Reviews of the Win or Lose Leases 
In addition to the various lawsuits involving Win or Lose, the 
Louisiana Attorney General’s Office has also examined, on several 
occasions, the legality and propriety of the corporation’s leases. Many of 
these reviews were to fulfill the campaign promises made by Attorney 
General Eugene Stanley, who vowed to investigate alleged wrongdoing 
associated with the letting of State mineral leases.159 The news coverage 
of the time reveals difficult relationships between Attorney General 
Stanley, the State Mineral Board, and Governor Sam Jones. The tension 
largely centered on whether sufficient evidence existed to bring any actual 
litigation against the Win or Lose State leases.160 A brief review of the 
results of those examinations is contained herein.161 
1. The 1936 Gardiner Letter
On February 27, 1936, Special Assistant to the Attorney General 
Lessley P. Gardiner issued a letter detailing the results of an inquiry into 
the validity of State Lease 327, one of the Win or Lose leases.162 Citing 
Acts 1915, No. 30 (as amended, Acts 1926, No. 315), Gardiner provided 
that the Governor was vested with the authority to execute State mineral 
 159. Stanley Declares Issue is Freedom Versus Slavery, MORNING 
ADVOCATE, Jan. 14, 1938. 
 160. Action on Oil Lease Frauds in Louisiana Urged by Gov. Jones, 
SHREVEPORT TIMES, May 9, 1943, at 10; B. L. Krebs, Jones Asks Action on Oil 
Leases Let by Long Regime, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 9, 1943, at 1; Mineral Board 
to Hire Special Counsel if Stanley Doesn’t Act, SHREVEPORT TIMES, May 12, 
1943, at 2; Mineral Board to Quiz Stanley at Meeting Today, SHREVEPORT TIMES, 
May 20, 1943, at 6; THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, State Body Asks Special Counsel: 
Seeks Aid on Oil Leases; Stanley Sees No Fraud, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 21, 
1943, at 1. 
 161. This particular review excludes the Attorney General’s participation as 
an amicus curiae in the Roussel v. Noe matter. On September 15, 1973, Attorney 
General William J. Guste, in his amicus brief, noted that the Attorney General’s 
investigation of this matter produced no legally admissible evidence of fraud. 
Aside from that mention, there is no substantive analysis of the facts that is worthy 
of review here and that document is thus excluded from this review. 
 162. Letter from Lessley P. Gardiner, Special Assistant Att’y Gen., to the 
McGinley Corporation (Feb. 27, 1936) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). The 
letter appears to have originated as an informal Attorney General’s Opinion 
request from a private party, which was answered formally through this letter. 
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leases to the highest bidder “under such terms and conditions as to him 
seem proper.”163 Gardiner also noted that, as to State Lease 327: all 
formalities were complied with; the bid from W.T. Burton was the only 
one received for this lease; and the lease was duly executed in his favor.164 
Gardiner’s assessment of the applicable law is accurate and, at the time, 
the Governor held plenary authority to grant State mineral leases.165 A 
review of the public records related to State Lease 327 also indicates that 
Gardiner’s statements about the bid process were accurate. 
2. The 1941 Gensler Memorandum
On April 16, 1941, Philip Gensler, a Special Assistant Attorney 
General, authored a memorandum analyzing State Lease 335.166 Although 
this memorandum does not so state, it appears to be a preliminary 
assessment or a status report of ongoing inquiries. With respect to this lease, 
Gensler concluded that, should a proper investigation be made, The Texas 
Company would be shown to have known or condoned allegedly 
inappropriate actions of various officials involved in the granting of State 
Lease 335.167 Therefore, it was not an innocent third party purchaser of its 
rights in the lease.168 However, due to a lack of evidence, Gensler stopped 
short of concluding that actual fraud was involved in the granting of State 
Lease 335. Gensler also noted that, should a suit to cancel these leases be 
instituted, the suit would have to be filed against W.T. Burton, Delta 
Development Company, the Land Investment Company, The Texas 
Company, and the Win or Lose Oil Corporation—by then, the Independent 
Oil and Gas Company, Inc.169 With the foregoing in mind, Gensler noted 
that further investigation of his preliminary findings should be made.170 
Additionally, if evidence proving fraud could not be obtained, then the 
continued viability of State Lease 335 should be examined from the 
perspective of reasonable development of the lease as required by the law.171 
Gensler essentially deferred the questions of illegality to the Crime 
Commission and made no legally binding conclusions. Certainly, his 
163. Id. at 1. 
164. Id. 
165. See William O. Bonin, Public Mineral Leasing in Louisiana, 27 TUL. L. 
REV. 246, 246–47 (1953). 
 166. Memorandum from Philip Gensler, Special Assistant Att’y Gen. (Apr. 
16, 1941) (describing the result of an investigation of State Lease No. 335) (on 
file with the La. Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Gensler Memorandum]. 
167. Id. at 10–11. 
168. Id. at 11. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
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observation that The Texas Company may not have acquired its interest in 
State Lease 335 is intriguing and would undermine a claim that The Texas 
Company—later Texaco—held its interests in this lease in good faith.172 
However, Gensler provides no evidence to support this allegation. In fact, 
he even admits that, absent such evidence, there is no basis for attacking 
the legality of the lease based upon this analysis.173 
3. The 1941 Perrault Memorandum and Analysis
Shortly after the release of Gensler’s memorandum, Second Assistant 
Attorney General W.C. Perrault issued a memorandum to Attorney 
General Eugene Stanley on July 15, 1941, detailing many of Gensler’s 
arguments.174 As an initial matter, Perrault stated that, “[a] number of 
suspicious circumstances attended the execution of the . . . leases.”175 The 
State Leases examined by Perrault were State Leases 309, 318, 323, 334, 
335, 340, 341, and 344.176 Perrault provided that the original lessee made 
large profits by the assignment of some of the leases involved in this 
inquiry.177 Nonetheless, such a scenario does not, in and of itself, make the 
lease transactions illegal. 
However, Perrault did identify specific problems with the subject 
leases. There were some instances where “bids accepted by the State were 
typewritten and the amount of the bid filled in in blank places on the 
 172. The absence of evidence to support an allegation of bad faith becomes 
important, as discussed at length below, when considering what rights Texaco and 
its subsequent iterations have in such leases today. It should be noted that the 
Texaco Global Settlement Agreement in 1994 likely undermines pursuing any 
litigation theory related to Texaco’s bad faith as to any of the leases covered by 
that agreement from 1994 to the present. See discussion infra Part V.C. 
173. Gensler Memorandum, supra note 166, at 11. 
 174. Memorandum from W.C. Perrault, Second Assistant Att’y Gen., to 
Eugene Stanley, La. Att’y Gen. (July 15, 1941) (regarding State Mineral Leases 
Nos. 309, 318, 323, 334, 335, 340, 341, and 344) (on file with the La. Dep’t of 
Justice) [hereinafter Perrault Memorandum]. 
175. Id. at 1. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. It is important to note that, although this information is interesting, 
there is nothing unlawful about a State lessee obtaining a lease and then selling, 
whether immediately or at some point after the awarding of the lease, rights in the 
lease to third parties at a profit. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:128 (stating that 
any transfer or assignment of state owned mineral rights requires State Mineral 
and Energy Board approval; noting that the statute contains no restrictions as to 
profit making on such assignments). 
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typewritten copy on the day of the acceptance . . . .”178 In other instances, 
Perrault states that, “it was questionable if the [State] accepted the best bid 
. . . .”179 Perrault also identified other instances “where the best bid was 
unquestionably not accepted but a lower bid actually accepted . . . .”180 In 
addition, Perrault cites instances where an executed lease “carried no cash 
consideration as required by the advertisement . . . .”181 and where “only a 
nominal cash consideration was paid for the lease . . . .”182 Finally, Perrault 
states that, “in all of the leases the Win-or-Lose Oil Company, composed 
principally of officials of the former government, winds up with an 
interest.”183 
 178. Perrault Memorandum, supra note 174, at 1. For this problem, Perrault 
references State Leases 318, 334, 335, 340, 341, and 344. Id. A reexamination of 
the bid forms for these leases confirms that the amounts on these bid forms were, 
indeed, hand written into typed forms. However, unlike Perrault’s conclusion that 
the, “blank places [were filled in] on the day of the acceptance,” our review of 
these documents demonstrates that there is no indication as to when these amounts 
were written into the forms. Thus, we cannot now conclude that this issue 
identified by Perrault amounts to a problem that would constitute a legal error for 
the subject leases. 
 179. Id. In this regard, Perrault references State Lease 323. Id. A review of the 
available public records related to this lease does not show any connection to Win 
or Lose Corporation aside from the fact that the lease was granted by Governor 
Noe. In addition, this lease is no longer viable. It was released on July 22, 1953. 
Accordingly, this lease is not considered further. 
 180. Id. Concerning this situation, Perrault references State Lease 335. Id. A 
review of the public records for this lease reflects that only one bid was 
submitted—that of W.T. Burton. No higher or lower bids for this lease exist. 
 181. Id. An example of this scenario is cited as State Lease 309. Id. Perrault is 
correct that there was no cash bonus paid for State Lease 309. There does not 
appear to be any explanation for this absence. It is important to note, however, 
that none of the law related to mineral leasing at the time required such 
consideration. Act No. 30, § 3, 1915 La. Acts 62, as amended by Act No. 315, 
1926 La. Acts 606-07. However, the same law did provide the Governor with 
plenary authority to accept or reject any bids in his discretion. Id. It is thus 
probable that, as there was no legal requirement for the consideration, and because 
the Governor had plenary authority to accept or reject bids, he was authorized to 
waive this requirement if it was not met. This notion is supported by a letter to 
Governor Allen by Attorney General Porterie in which the Attorney General 
stresses the plenary authority of the Governor in the granting of mineral leases 
under the terms and conditions that the Governor, in his discretion, sees fit. Letter 
from Gaston L. Porterie, La. Att’y Gen., to Oscar K. Allen, La. Governor (Jan. 
23, 1936) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). Further, testimony elicited during 
the United States v. Noe trial, discussed supra, indicates that the consideration 
provided for State Lease 309 was the agreement to drill fifty wells rather than 
paying a cash bonus. United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8, at 62–
63 (citing testimony of Leonard M. Levy). 
 182. Perrault Memorandum, supra note 174, at 1. State Lease 323 is cited for 
this problem. Id. 
183. Id. 
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Despite the identified problems with these leases, Perrault ultimately 
concluded that, due to a lack of proof of fraud, the insinuation of fraud 
from the circumstances was legally insufficient to proceed with judicial 
action aimed at cancelling these leases.184 In that regard, Perrault states: 
Despite the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution 
of these leases, as above pointed out, I am not prepared to say that 
fraud entered into these transactions. Investigation thus far made 
has unearthed none, and no further evidence can be secured except 
from those who may have participated in the fraud, if any fraud 
existed. I think, therefore, that these leases cannot successfully be 
attacked for fraud because of lack of proof. Mere suspicion or 
probability of its existence are insufficient under the law.185 
This statement appears to be the most significant indictment of the 
conspiracy theories surrounding the Win or Lose leases existing since its 
inception in the 1930s. There is no reasonable basis on which to doubt or 
deny Perrault’s assessment of the evidentiary problems for making a case 
for fraud. Bound by the laws on fraud in place at the time, any new suit to 
prove what Perrault did not believe could be proven in 1941 likely would 
be impossible today. As Perrault correctly states, mere insinuation and 
184. Id. 
 185. Id. At the end of this statement, Perrault cites to “9 La. Dig., Section 50, 
Page 95, citing numerous cases.” Although the page numbers differ today, the 
general citation, “9 La. Dig., Section 50,” remains the same as it was in 1941. It 
is from the Louisiana Digest, and it deals with the presumptions and burdens of 
proof for fraud. Rather than simply citing to this section of the Louisiana Digest, 
it seems more appropriate to actually cite some of the cases that Perrault would 
have seen in the Digest in 1941. In Angichiodo v. Cerami, 35 F. Supp. 359, 369 
(W.D. La. 1940), a Louisiana federal court noted that, “[f]raud is never imputed 
except on legal and convincing evidence produced by the one alleging it.” In 
addition, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Rachal, 
166 So. 129, 130 (La. 1936), noted that, “[f]raud is never presumed, and the 
burden rests upon the person alleging fraud to prove it.” See also Garnier v. Aetna 
Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 159 So. 705 (La. 1935); Strauss v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
102 So. 861 (La. 1925); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 57 So. 935 (La. 1912); Breaux v. 
Broussard, 40 So. 639 (La. 1906). In addition to these cases, in 1941, there were 
an additional twelve appellate court cases in the Louisiana Digest in which the 
various courts espoused the same principle. The purpose of this examination of 
Perrault’s citation is to note that Perrault’s conclusion that fraud is difficult to 
prove and cannot be based upon supposition was soundly based upon the 
Louisiana jurisprudence at the time. The same basic standard of proof for fraud 
applies today. See, e.g., Hall v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 368 So.2d 984, 993 
(La. 1978), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 452 U.S. 571 
(1981) (“It is well settled that one who alleges fraud has the burden of establishing 
it by legal and convincing evidence since fraud is never presumed, and that to 
establish fraud exceptionally strong proof must be adduced.”). 
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innuendo that something is amiss with the subject leases does not create a 
colorable basis upon which to bring a fraud suit. The missing component 
to bringing such a suit is, as Perrault notes, evidence from those involved 
in the fraud. In 1941, many of the key individuals noted in Part II of this 
article were alive and able to interview. Thus, in 1941, with the exceptions 
of Huey P. Long and Oscar K. Allen, the Louisiana Attorney General’s 
Office could have probed further into the fraud allegations by collecting 
information from living informants. Today, the necessary individuals to 
take a mere allegation to a colorable legal claim are deceased—the missing 
evidence is forever lost. This latter statement is tempered by the existence 
of some available testimony from the 1942 U.S. v. Noe matter and some 
depositions that were taken in the 1970s for the Roussel v. Noe matter. Yet, 
as was shown in the reviews of these cases above, even questioning by 
federal prosecutors in the U.S. v. Noe trial and by private attorneys in 
preparation for the Roussel v. Noe case elicited no evidence of fraud 
related to the State’s leasing to W.T. Burton or the Win or Lose 
Corporation.186 
In defense of the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office in 1941, a later 
letter by Special Assistant Attorney General Philip Gensler suggests that 
the primary reason for no subsequent investigation of those alive with 
knowledge of the acquisition of the subject leases appears to have been 
due to lack of support.187 In this regard, Gensler stated that, “[d]ue to the 
limited personnel of our office and lack of appropriation, the Louisiana 
Attorney General’s Office has not been offered the opportunity of making 
thorough investigation of these leases . . . .”188 This statement illustrates a 
recurring theme—that any investigation of this matter takes time and 
money—that resonates throughout the history of the Win or Lose 
matter.189 
Further, Perrault noted that as early as 1941, most of the subject 
mineral leases were held by third parties, making their cancellation even 
more difficult.190 With respect to this problem, Perrault stated: 
186. See generally discussion supra part II.A.3. 
 187. Letter from Philip Gensler, Special Assistant Att’y Gen., to State Mineral 
Board (Oct. 31, 1941) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Gensler 
Letter]. 
188. Id. at 2. 
189. See, e.g., La. H.R. 88 (2012) (proposing that the Louisiana Attorney 
General’s Office investigate mineral lease contracts with the Win or Lose 
Corporation, which was ultimately defeated in the House Judiciary Committee on 
May 17, 2012). 
190. Perrault Memorandum, supra note 174, at 1. 
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All of the leases are presently owned by third persons who, 
presumably at least, dealt on the faith of the public records in 
acquiring them, and they cannot be set aside to the prejudice of 
these persons unless it be shown by competent evidence that they 
had prior knowledge of any fraud practiced upon the State by the 
original lessees. We have no such proof.191 
Therefore, the same problem, with an additional seventy-plus years of 
assignments and other transfers of the subject leases, is a remaining 
obstacle to any State action today. 
4. The 1937 Wood Memorandum
On July 6, 1937, C.C. Wood, of the Office of the Attorney General, 
issued a memorandum analyzing potential problems with State Lease 
318.192 In this memorandum, Wood notes that there is no term identified 
in State Lease 318.193 However, he also stated that, while this is an odd 
omission from the lease, there are other provisions of the lease that trigger 
payments from the lessor, W.T. Burton, in order to maintain the lease in 
the event that no production is underway.194 Interestingly, Wood provided 
that, “[a]ccording to the information that we have, a conspiracy was 
confected between Burton and James A. Noe whereby Burton was to 
secure the lease . . . [and] assign the lease to The Texas Company . . . .”195 
Further, Wood discussed how the private interests in this lease were to be 
divided among Burton, The Texas Company, and Win or Lose.196 
Although Wood specifically referred to “information that we have,”197 he 
did not elaborate on what this information was. Research on this matter 
has failed to identify any information in support of this conspiracy claim. 
Wood also alluded to the possibility that the information that he refers to 
came by word-of-mouth from someone who witnessed Burton’s grand 
jury testimony.198 However, there is nothing concrete in Wood’s 
memorandum on this point and efforts to locate information related to the 
grand jury have been unsuccessful. 
191. Id. at 1. 
 192. Memorandum from C.C. Wood, Special Assistant Att’y Gen. (July 6, 
1937) (describing the results of an investigation of State Lease No. 318) (on file 
with the La. Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Wood Memorandum]. 
193. Id. at 1. 
194. Id. at 1–2. 
195. Id. at 3. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Wood Memorandum, supra note 192, at 4. 
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Additionally, Wood identified some of the proof problems inherent in 
the conspiracy allegation. For instance, he referenced Burton’s grand jury 
testimony. Burton allegedly stated that Governor Allen, although a 
participant in the lease later through Win or Lose, did not know of the 
connection that he would later have to the lease that he originally granted 
to Burton.199 Wood believed that this lack of a connection to Allen was 
defeating of a viable conspiracy claim.200 In this regard, he stated that: “[i]f 
we could show that Allen was also a member of this conspiracy, we feel 
certain that this lease could be set aside as having been obtained by 
fraudulent means, but unless we can show that, the possibility of success 
along this course is remote.”201 Presumably, the primary reason that such 
involvement could not be proven was due to Allen’s untimely death; any 
testimony regarding his involvement would likely be subject to hearsay 
exceptions. 
Wood also provided, if it could be proven that The Texas Company 
had participated in the actual acquisition of State Lease 318 rather than 
merely being a third party acquirer of an interest from Burton, then the 
lease may be voidable.202 However, aside from suggesting that The Texas 
Company may have been induced not to bid on the lease in order to keep 
the actual lease price artificially low, Wood offererd no other explanation 
of The Texas Company’s involvement in the letting of State Lease 318. 
Specifically, Wood did not refer to any evidence, nor has any such 
evidence since been identified to support this theory.203 
Wood’s memorandum also included several other theories for 
invalidating State Lease 318, including, but not limited to, cancelling the 
lease for the lessee’s failure to timely pay rentals.204 Although State Lease 
318 was the subject of the State v. Burton suit,205 that suit was dismissed 
upon a settlement to which the State was a party.206 Thus, even if Wood’s 
theories for cancelling the lease were correct, the 1943 settlement over the 
lease effectively estops the State from now complaining of the results of 
that settlement, which included the continued existence of the lease. 
However, Wood did not know this at the time, as the settlement occurred 
six years after he authored his memorandum. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Wood Memorandum, supra note 192, at 5–7. 
205. (La. 14th J.D.C. 1944) (No. 22, 664) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
206. See Joint Motion for Dismissal, supra note 104. 
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Nonetheless, State Lease 318 no longer exists; it was released in 
portions, concluding with a final release in 1975.207 Since the lease was 
allowed to continue after the settlement of the State v. Burton litigation, 
and the State obtained benefits from its continuance until its release in 
1975, there is nothing to cancel. Therefore, it is inadvisable to seek 
rescission of the rights that flowed from the lease when it was extant, if 
such is even a possibility. 
5. The 1941 Gay Memorandum
On October 8, 1941, Edward J. Gay, Jr., with the Louisiana Attorney 
General’s Office, produced a memorandum analyzing the legality and 
validity of State Lease 340.208 In this review, Gay noted that the lease, 
which was granted to W.T Burton by Governor James A. Noe on February 
7, 1936, did not include an overriding royalty.209 According to Gay, the 
overriding royalty of up to $500,000 from a 1/128th share of production 
was added by way of a rider after the submission of the original bid.210 
However, it is unclear upon what Gay based this conclusion regarding the 
later addition of a rider—a document that, today, is often made a part of 
an original lease document. Gay properly noted that Burton’s overriding 
royalty offer to the State was above and beyond the mandatory 12.5% 
royalty.211 When it was submitted, it was substantially less than that of 
other bidders, particularly the bid of Gulf Company, which included an 
 207. Affidavit of Lease Cancellation, State Lease 318 (on file with the La. Dep’t 
of Justice). 
 208. Memorandum from Edward J. Gay, Jr., Office of the Att’y Gen. (Oct. 8, 
1941) (describing the results of an investigation of State Lease No. 340) (on file 
with the La. Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Gay Memorandum]. 
 209. Id. at 5. The term “overriding royalty,” which differs from royalties that 
are typically received by a landowner as the grantor of a mineral lease, is defined 
as: 
[A]n interest carved out of the lessee’s working interest. It entitles its 
owner to a fraction of production free of any production or operating 
expense, but not free of production or severance tax levied on 
production. An overriding royalty may be created by a grant or by 
reservation. Commonly, an override is reserved by the assignor in a 
farmout agreement or other assignment. An override’s duration 
corresponds to that of the lease from which it was created. 
UNIV. OF TEX., supra note 54, at 191. See also WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 
54, at 410. It is important to note, because of the reality that many of the Win or 
Lose leases are subject to overrides in favor of various right holders, that such an 
activity was not and is not uncommon in Louisiana (or elsewhere). See John M. 
McCollam, A Primer for the Practice of Mineral Law Under the New Louisiana 
Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. REV. 732, 828 (1976). 
210. Gay Memorandum, supra note 208, at 2, 5. 
211. Id. at 5. 
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overriding royalty of $1,250,000.00.212 However, none of the other bidders 
on State Lease 340 offered a bonus or a rental to the State that was as large 
as that offered by Burton.213 Because of the differences between the 
overriding royalty offers and the bonus and rental submitted by the bidders 
for State Lease 340, Gay did not, and likely could not, make a 
determination as to whether the lease to Burton constituted the lease that 
was most advantageous to the State. However, he did note that, “[t]he main 
point to be considered, therefore, is whether or not the lease was granted 
to the person submitting the most advantageous bid as required by law.”214 
There is no indication from this memorandum whether the “most 
advantageous” analysis was ever undertaken. Gay certainly does not make 
any determination or declaration that the Burton bid or the subsequent 
lease was invalid, but merely notes the possible irregularities of the late 
and low overriding royalty. Ultimately, Gay never answers whether this 
bid was most advantageous to the State considering the higher and timely 
bonus and rental of Gulf Company.215 
6. The 1941 Gensler Letter
Philip Gensler’s letter is addressed to the State Mineral Board and 
appears to summarize the findings reported in the previously discussed 
1941 Perrault Memorandum to Attorney General Stanley.216 
For an unstated reason, Gensler’s October 31, 1941 letter to the Board 
refers to more State leases being reviewed than those covered by the Perrault 
Memorandum.217 A review of the public records clearly indicates that W.T. 
Burton’s involvement in the leasing was not the reason for the review of 
these additional leases. Although he was the lessee of State Lease 42, he was 
not the lessee on any of the additional leases that were not considered in the 
Perrault Memorandum.218 A letter by Special Assistant Attorney General 
Edward L. Gladney, Jr., to Major B.A. Hardey, Chairman of the State 
Mineral Board provides a probable answer to why these additional leases 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. See Gensler Letter, supra note 187. 
217. Compare id. at 1, with Perrault Memorandum, supra note 174, at 1. The 
additional leases not covered in the Perrault Memorandum include: State Lease 
Nos. 42, 50, 164, 194, 199, 301, 331, 347, and 356. 
 218. In addition to the Burton leases noted, infra, W.T. Burton was also the 
State’s lessee on the following State Leases granted prior to 1941 (the date of the 
Gensler Letter and the Perrault Memorandum): 321, 322, 326, 327, 330, 332, 336, 
and 337. None of these leases were assigned to the Win or Lose Corporation or 
any of its officers. 
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were reviewed by the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office.219 In the letter, 
Gladney references “sixteen leases which the Attorney General was 
requested ‘to take action immediately to recover for the State of Louisiana 
all profits or overriding royalties fraudulently or illegally obtained in 
connection with any mineral lease covering State owned property . . . .’”220 
Apparently, these additional leases were part of a broader request from the 
State Mineral Board for the Attorney General to review a collection of leases 
for possible illegalities or underdevelopment.221 Thus, Gensler’s 1941 letter 
to the State Mineral Board would constitute an interim report on each of 
these reviews. 
However, Gensler stated that thus far, no evidence of fraud had been 
found.222 Gensler stated, “[i]n practically all of these instances, the State 
has received rentals and royalties from said leases.”223 This point cannot 
be overstated. Pursuant to Acts 1915, No. 30, as amended by Acts 1926, 
No. 315, the State could not lease its property for oil and gas production 
for less than a one-eighth royalty reserved to the State.224 The royalty rates 
at which the State would be paid for each of the leases noted in the Perrault 
Memorandum were all one-eighth—precisely consistent with what the law 
required.225 In other words, the State received all of the royalties that it was 
due as provided by law, regardless of whether and to whom the leases were 
awarded or assigned. 
Based upon the preliminary results reported in this letter, Gensler 
concluded that the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office is “ . . . not prepared 
to prove fraud by legally admissible evidence with reference to the above 
referred to suspicious circumstances.”226 In addition to this assessment, 
Gensler goes on to note that: “[m]ost of these leases are held by third parties 
at the present time and, in order to cancel same as of their inception, fraud 
would have to be shown in the present holders, or that they did not acquire 
 219. See Letter from Edward L. Gladney, Jr., Special Assistant Att’y Gen., to 
Major B.A. Hardey, Chairman, State Mineral Board (Apr. 29, 1943) (on file with 
the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
220. Id. at 1. 
 221. The broader inquiry by the Attorney General is discussed in an article in 
THE TIMES-PICAYUNE newspaper in 1940. In this article, Attorney General 
Stanley details his intent to investigate numerous pre-State Mineral Board leases 
for unlawful activity and failure to develop the leases. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Stanley Plans Suits for Hundred Million in State Oil Leases, TIMES-PICAYUNE, 
Aug. 15, 1940, at 1. 
222. Gensler Letter, supra note 187, at 2. 
223. Id. 
224. See Act No. 30, 1915 La. Acts 62, as amended by Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 
606. 
225. See Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 606-07. 
226. Gensler Letter, supra note 187, at 2. 
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in good faith on the face of the public records.”227 Particularly, if there had 
been any fraud in the acquisition of the subject leases from the State, the 
parties with an interest in the leases as of the date of the letter that relied 
on the public records, as Louisiana law encourages and permits,228 would 
have “clean hands.” Therefore, it could not be stripped of their rights under 
these leases that were acquired in good faith. 
The letter goes on to discuss matters related to whether these leases 
had been properly developed as of the date of the letter. Gensler admitted 
that the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office is not equipped to make such 
assessments and thus, recommended that more information be supplied to 
the State Mineral Board by the State Geologist, the State Board of 
Engineers, and the Conservation Department to answer this question.229 
7. The 1943 Gladney Letter
On May 18, 1943, Edward L. Gladney, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney 
General, authored a letter to the State Mineral Board detailing the validity 
and viability of State Lease 309.230 Much like the earlier analyses of the 
Win or Lose leases, Gladney concluded as to State Lease 309 that, “[t]here 
is no evidence to indicate fraud in connection with this lease and its 
amendment. Certainly a suit should not be filed based upon nothing more 
than ‘suspicious circumstances.’”231 
State Lease 309 was a lease obtained by James A. Noe in his own 
name.232 Noe was not the Governor at the time, but rather was a Louisiana 
State Senator. Although this lease is not a W.T. Burton lease, it eventually 
became part of the Win or Lose assets.233 
In addition, Gladney reviewed the applicable law at the time. 
Regarding whether Noe was a proper lessee and whether Governor Allen, 
as a shareholder in the Win or Lose Corporation, could authorize such a 
lease, Gladney found that: 
At no time during any of the foregoing transactions [(i.e., the 
227. Id. 
 228. See Warren L. Mengis, The Public Records Doctrine Revisited, 
Presentation at the 37th Annual Louisiana Mineral Law Institute (Mar. 29, 1990). 
229. Gensler Letter, supra note 187, at 2–3. 
230. See generally Letter from Edward L. Gladney, Jr., Special Assistant Att’y 
Gen., to State Mineral Board (May 18, 1943) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice) 
[hereinafter Gladney Letter]. 
231. Id. at 15. 
232. Id. at 2–3. 
233. Noe assigned his interests in State Lease 309 “to the Win or Lose 
Corporation on November 20, 1934, in exchange for [ninety-eight] shares of its 
stock.” Id. at 5. 
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bidding and leasing process)] was there a prohibitory statute that 
rendered Noe (State Senator from May 9, 1932 to February 26, 
1935, and Lieutenant Governor from February 26, 1935 to January 
28, 1936, and Governor from January 28, 1936 to May 12, 1936) 
ineligible to bid on and secure a lease on State mineral lands. Nor 
was Governor Allen, a shareholder in the Win or Lose 
Corporation, enjoined by statute from owning stock in a 
corporation securing oil or gas rights under a State lease granted 
to another by him.234 
This analysis led Gladney to the conclusion that there were no illegal 
or unlawful actions that resulted in the leasing of State Lease 309.235 
In addition to the initial leasing of State Lease 309, subsequent 
questions were raised regarding whether sufficient development of the 
lease had occurred to maintain the 3,300 original acres of the lease.236 
During the issuance of the lease in 1934 and the amendment of the lease 
related to possible development insufficiencies in 1935, six wells were 
drilled. Subsequent to the amendment, Gladney notes that an additional 35 
wells were drilled on the property by May 11, 1943, for which the State 
received $159,137.85 in royalties.237 Thus, concluding that there had been 
sufficient development of the lease to maintain it as to the entire acreage.238 
Gladney also went to great lengths to examine the validity of the 
amended agreement to and the assignments of State Lease 309.239 The 
latter is of particular import to the current inquiry, as it is through 
assignments that the Win or Lose Corporation acquired its interests in all 
of the leases noted in this report. Gladney, after reviewing the 
circumstances surrounding these assignments and the amendment, found 
234. Id. at 15. 
235. Id.; see also id. at 9, in which Gladney notes that 
We are not aware of any charge of fraud in the granting of the lease on 
October 23, 1934. But on [sic] irregularity has been noted. It is, in our 
opinion, of no legal consequence. Noe’s bid failed to respond to the 
published notice in that it did not offer to the State a bonus. 
With regard to this “irregularity Gladney noted that, because the main aim of the lease 
was development and the acquisition of royalties by the State, it could not be said that 
the lack of a bonus was problematic and that, regardless of the lack of adherence to 
the notice, it was well within Governor Allen’s discretion to grant the lease if he 
believed such a bid was in the best interests of the State. Id. at 9–10. 
236. Id. at 5–9. 
 237. Id. at 9. A very rough calculation of the inflationary value of this $159,137.85 
figure from 1943 in 2016 dollars is $2,220,828.49. In addition, Gladney notes that the 
State also received $73,500.00 during this period in rentals from State Lease 309 (or 
$1,025,720.12 in 2016 dollars). Id. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl [https://perma.cc/5VUN-7XQ7]. 
238. Gladney Letter, supra note 230, at 9. 
239. Id. at 11–15. 
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no legal error sufficient to invalidate the lease.240 Further, Gladney stated 
that, with regard to a State Mineral Board’s resolution seeking that the 
Attorney General, “recover for the State ‘all profits or overriding royalties 
fraudulently or illegally obtained . . . .’”241 
In analyzing State Lease 309, problems concerning recovery were also 
expressed. Gladney characterized these problems, by stating: 
Unless and until the lease be annulled and [set] aside, we can 
conceive of no legal theory under which the State would have a 
right to participate in the profits derived from the sale of the 
lessee’s interest. Even if the contract is invalidated, we can find 
no precedent in Louisiana jurisprudence which [sic] would permit 
recovery by the State of profits from the transaction to which it is 
not a party.242 
As is evident from the analysis of numerous legal theories, the same 
lack of privity between the State and the third party assignees and others 
exist today as it did in 1943. Thus, the same problem of recovery exists.243 
Also important in the 1943 Gladney Memorandum is a discussion of 
Gensler’s 1941 Memorandum analyzing the validity of State Lease 309.244 
In this discussion, Gladney acknowledges that Gensler originally called 
for the filing of suit to annul State Lease 309.245 However, as Gladney 
correctly noted, Gensler’s analysis was preliminary and the latter called 
for additional research prior to the filing of such a suit.246 Gladney’s 1943 
Memorandum is the additional research called for by Gensler two years 
before.247 This more comprehensive examination identified no legal basis 
on which to challenge State Lease 309, leading Gladney to conclude that 
“on the basis of all evidence before us . . . a suit by the State could not be 
successfully maintained and should not be instituted.”248 
240. Id. 
241. Id. at 13. 
242. Id. 
243. The difference between the current report and Gladney’s 1943 Memorandum 
in terms of the statement that “we can conceive of no legal theory . . . ” is that, rather 
than Gladney’s conclusory statement regarding a lack of a legal theory, this article, 
examines the possible applicability of a panoply of potential theories to the facts of 
this matter. 
244. Gladney Letter, supra note 230, at 16. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 17. 
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III. IMPLICATED LEASES
The historic litigation related to the Win or Lose Corporation made 
few substantive inquiries. Aside from some of the tangential matters 
addressed in the cases above, the main questions still remain: (1) whether 
certain State leases issued during the gubernatorial terms of Oscar K. Allen 
and James A. Noe are lawful and valid leases; (2) if the leases are not 
lawful and valid, what can be done to cancel the leases today and whether 
such action by the State is advisable; and (3) regardless if the leases were 
lawful or valid, whether the State was fairly and properly compensated 
under the leases. In order to answer these questions, the implicated leases 
must be identified and the field of inquiry must be narrowed to define the 
leases to which these questions should apply. 
A. State Leases Involved in the Win or Lose Matter 
A comprehensive review of Louisiana’s public records has identified 
which parties held the subject State leases. No leases identified Win or 
Lose as the original lessee from the State. Further, Win or Lose, Huey P. 
Long, Oscar K. Allen, Seymour Weiss, and Earle Christenberry were never 
direct lessees from the State. The only individuals identified in Part II of this 
article with a direct lessor-lessee relationship with the State were W.T. 
Burton, James A. Noe, and, much later, Independent Oil & Gas Company. 
Further research has revealed that State Leases 309, 318, 334, 335, 
340, 341, 343, and 344, were in part, held by or assigned to James A. Noe, 
Seymour Weiss, Earle Christenberry, or Win or Lose Corporation during 
the period between the formation of the Win or Lose Corporation and the 
end of James A. Noe’s term as governor. It is well documented that Noe’s 
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gubernatorial successor, Richard W. Leche, was unfriendly to Noe;249 
thus, making it unlikely that the former would have participated in or 
allowed Noe to skirt the law and illicitly acquire mineral leases from the 
State. It is doubtful that any undue influence of the Office of the Governor 
bore on mineral leases in favor of Win or Lose Corporation following 
Noe’s departure. Finally, Act No. 93 of 1936 substantially curtailed the 
plenary authority of the Governor of Louisiana regarding the issuance of 
mineral leases on State lands. This Act established the Louisiana State 
Mineral Board and vested leasing authority under the auspices of that 
body.250 Following the enactment of this law, which went into force on 
June 26, 1936, the Governor could no longer unilaterally issue State 
mineral leases, whether those issuances were based on the State’s best 
interests or the currying of political favor. Accordingly, with the Long, 
Allen, and Noe cronyism gone and the State Mineral Board serving as a 
check on the Governor’s leasing power, there is no compelling reason to 
examine the legality of post-1936 leases. 
B Leases That Need No Examination 
There are several leases, though initially appearing to be related to the 
Win or Lose matter, that do not merit any examination. These include 
leases that predate the Win or Lose period but were held by someone with 
a later-acquired interest in the Win or Lose leases or corporation, and also 
                                                                                                             
 249. Governor Leche ascended quickly from relative obscurity. He was Huey 
P. Long’s campaign manager in the Second Congressional District in 1930; he 
became secretary to Governor O.K. Allen, and by 1934, he was appointed to the 
Orleans Parish Court of Appeal. SINDLER, supra note 28, at 119. After Huey 
Long’s assassination in 1935, the Long political machine almost immediately 
broke apart. A split occurred in the Long machine, resulting in two major factions, 
each lead by a triumvirate of men. KANE, supra note 28, at 149; SINDLER, supra 
note 28, at 118; WHITE, supra note 12, at 268–69. The Reverend G.L.K. Smith, 
Earle J. Christenberry, and James Noe comprised the faction that held to Huey 
Long’s Share-Our-Wealth economics as well as his anti-New Deal, anti-
Roosevelt policies. The second faction, led by Robert Maestri, Seymour Weiss, 
and Abe Shushan, was the more conservative faction, seeking to preserve the 
political machine above all else. KANE, supra note 28, at 444. It was the latter 
faction that supported Leche for governor. James A. Noe had the chance to route 
Leche in his own run for governor, especially after O.K. Allen’s death. However, 
many of Noe’s initial supporters (especially G.L.K. Smith and Seymour Weiss) 
turned their backs on him in favor of Leche’s candidacy. Although Noe eventually 
made peace with these people and even secured a seat as a Louisiana State Senator 
in the election, there was resentment between himself and the others from 1936 
forward. McManus, supra note 10, at 27–33. 
 250. The State Mineral Board is now officially known as the Louisiana State 
Mineral and Energy Board (SMEB)—a name change that occurred pursuant to Act 
No. 196, 2009 La. Acts. 1981 (currently LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:121 (2009)). 
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leases that have lapsed and can no longer be challenged. The only leases 
that remain active and were issued or assigned during Oscar K. Allen’s or 
James A. Noe’s terms as governor are State Leases 309, 334, 335, 340, 
341, and 344. These leases are the subject of each of the following legal 
inquiries. However, the legal conclusions as to these leases apply the same 
as to the lapsed leases. 
IV. CURRENT LEGAL THEORIES 
There is no real legal or factual basis on which the State can claim a 
share of the lessees’ royalties from the Win or Lose leases. Lessee’s 
royalty shares, by their very nature, are that portion of the monies realized 
by mineral production that are retained by the lessee in exchange for the 
risks and expenses involved in mineral exploration and production.251 
Under the Louisiana law in force at the time the subject leases were 
granted, the interest share of production to lessees was set at a maximum 
of 87.5%.252 The State had and continues to have no claim, under general 
mineral law principles, to the lessee’s share of mineral production. Thus, 
the following legal theories, while presented and analyzed here as they 
apply to these leases, are only viable if it can be proven: (1) that the State 
has been underpaid its share by the original lessees; or (2) that the leases 
were issued illegally or were not issued in the best interests of the State. 
Because the State received its legally-required share of 12.5% from the 
Win or Lose leases—no less than the same share was received from other 
winning bidders at the time—it is difficult, if not impossible, to say that 
the State did not enter into the subject leases with its best interests in mind. 
As to the State’s interests in the subject leases, the analysis that 
follows has little practical application to “undoing” the Win or Lose leases. 
The reason, as stated throughout this article, is that since the State received 
its proper share of the minerals produced, any legal theories to invalidate 
these leases are useless because the State cannot show it suffered any harm 
or damages. Regardless of whether the legal theories reviewed herein are 
valid, the State still would have received its mandatory share of 12.5%. As 
is later discussed more fully, it is doubtful whether it would be in the 
State’s best interests to “undo” any of the Win or Lose leases today. While 
the following analysis may be used by heirs or descendants of the lessees 
to argue that certain of their interests vis-à-vis each other were not properly 
granted, such would constitute private causes of action in which the State 
cannot become involved. 
                                                                                                             
 251. 28 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 70:181 (4th ed. 2015); see also LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 31:123 (2016). 
 252. Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 606. 
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A. Malfeasance in Office 
The current version of the law prohibiting malfeasance in office, La. 
R.S. 14:134,253 is a manifestation of two former statutes. These statutes, 
which were the laws in force in the 1930s, are: Acts 1912, No. 254 (general 
malfeasance in office), and R.S. 1870, § 872 (failure of officer to perform 
duty).254 
Acts 1912, No. 254 § 1 is substantially similar to the current law in that it 
prohibits a civil officer from: “willfully fail[ing], refus[ing], or neglect[ing] to 
perform any official duty required of him . . . or [from] perfom[ing] any such 
duty in an unlawful manner . . . or permit[ting] any . . . officer, under his 
authority, to [do the same].”255 However, the former statute is stricter because 
it contains the phrase “required of him, personally, by law” rather than “any 
duty lawfully required of him.” According to the comments to La. R.S. 
14:134, the current phrasing includes the neglect or wrongful performance of 
any properly required duty, which would include administrative and 
departmental rules.256 
For a violation of the 1912 law to be found, the following elements 
must be proven: (1) the actor be a civil officer or an officer under a civil 
officer’s authority as contemplated by the statute; (2) the actor had an 
official duty required of him, personally, by law; and (3) the actor either 
neglected to perform such a duty or performed such a duty in an unlawful 
manner.257 The remedy that existed under this law in the 1930s was that 
the officer “shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor in office, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by being condemned to pay a fine 
not to exceed five hundred dollars, or to suffer imprisonment, not 
exceeding six months, or both, at the discretion of the court.”258 
Thus, a review of the malfeasance in office laws of the time reveals 
that such a law would not apply to Oscar K. Allen’s or James A. Noe’s 
253. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:134 (enacted in 1980 in modern form). 
 254. Although the official comments to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:134 note 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 872 (1870) as a source for the current law, a review of that 
section reveals that that former law is essentially a penal provision that would 
accompany a mandamus action under the current LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3861, 
et seq., for the failure of a public official to undertake an action that he or she is 
required to do under the law. All of the Win or Lose-related activities (i.e., leasing, 
etc.) would not qualify as mandatory duties. See, e.g., Allen v. St. Tammany 
Parish Police Jury, 690 So.2d 150, 153 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97) (“Mandamus 
will not lie in matters in which discretion and evaluation of evidence must be 
exercised.”). Thus, mandamus (and presumably an action under LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 872 (1870)) would not lie against any party to the Win or Lose matter. 
255. Act No. 254, § 1, 1912 La Acts. 563. 
256. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:134, cmt. 
257. See id. 
258. Id. 
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granting of the Win or Lose leases, as there is no proof that they either 
neglected to perform such a duty or performed such a duty in an unlawful 
manner. The penalty for violating this law is against the public officer.259 
If proof existed of this activity, the only remedy for the State would be a 
conviction of one or more governors who died decades ago—an 
impossibility. The best the State could hope for if it chose to use this theory 
to attack the Win or Lose leases is that the acts of the long-deceased 
governors would be found unlawful and thus nullified. As is noted 
throughout the article, no evidence of such unlawful action has been found. 
Thus, proving malfeasance in office is highly unlikely. 
B. Ethical Violations–Ethics Laws in 1936 
Had they happened today, the mineral leasing actions of Oscar K. 
Allen and James A. Noe during their terms as governor, from 1934 through 
1936, would certainly violate current ethics statutes.260 The problem with 
applying modern concepts of governmental ethics to the Win or Lose 
matter is that such laws did not exist in Louisiana at the time of the 
occurrence of any of the actions reviewed here. Because there were no 
prohibitions to this activity in the 1930s, neither can it be said that the 
governors acted unethically (from a legal, not a moral, perspective), nor 
that they created absolutely null contracts by knowing that they were likely 
to reap a benefit from the leases. 
C. Bid Collusion 
Certain allegations have been made that the letting of the Win or Lose 
leases in the 1930s constituted unlawful bid collusion.261 Collusive bidding 
is defined as the illegal attempt by conspiring bidders to circumvent rules 
and laws drawn to ensure free and competitive bidding.262 The general idea 
behind these allegations is that the letting of the Win or Lose leases in such 
259. Id. 
 260. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1112 (prohibiting public servants from 
“participating in a transaction in which he has a personal substantial economic 
interest”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1116(C) (prohibiting the participation of a 
regulatory employee “in the sale of goods or services to a person regulated by his 
public agency”). It is likely that these modern laws would prohibit the sort of 
public/private activities that led to the Win or Lose leasing. 
261. See, e.g., Lee Zurik, Lee Zurik Investigation: The Texaco Connection, Fox 8 
WVUE, May 15, 2012, fox8live.com/story/18428728/the-texaco-connection [https: 
//perma.cc/MV5R-5VDK] (noting that a former State employee questioned the 
collusion of parties with regard to some of the Win or Lose-related leases). 
 262. See Collusive Bidding Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
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a manner—one that ultimately benefited the Win or Lose Corporation—
constituted bid collusion as between Allen and Noe and the 
lessees/assignees of these leases. 
In Louisiana, bid collusion is prohibited under the Louisiana Antitrust 
Law found at La. R.S. 51:121, et seq. Although the Louisiana Antitrust 
Law, in its current iteration, is a law of recent vintage,263 we note that 
contemporaneously with the adoption of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. (Sherman Act), the Louisiana Legislature passed Act 
86 of 1890, containing a provision similar to that found in the Sherman 
Act. This act stated that every contract or combination in restraint of trade 
was declared to be illegal.264 
In 1892, the Legislature enacted Act 90, thereby adding new sections 
to Act 86 of 1890.265 Particularly, Act 90 prohibited the formation of trusts 
and the entering into agreements by individuals, firms, corporations, or 
other entities in order to influence trade in any manner as to affect 
prices.266 The Act also provided for the revocation of the charters of 
corporations violating the provisions of this Act and prohibited foreign 
corporations that violated the Act from doing business in this State.267 
Additionally, Act 90, § 7 made explicit that “any contract or agreement in 
violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be absolutely void.”268 
Following the same principle, Act 11 of the Extraordinary Legislative 
Session of 1915 declared illegal, “every contract, combination in the form 
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in 
the State of Louisiana.”269 In addition, Act 11 established the penalty for 
violators at $5,000, or imprisonment with or without hard labor, not 
exceeding three years. In addition, the Act provided general procedure 
guidelines to prosecute the violators. Therefore, Act 11 of 1915 is 
particularly relevant to this analysis because it would control any 
combinations, conspiracies, or monopolies that presumably were in 
violation of the antitrust law in the 1930s. 
                                                                                                             
 263. It was amended to its present form in 2003. 
 264. Act No. 86 § 1, 1890 La. Act 1806 reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
[E]very contract, combination in the form of trust, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce to fix or limit the amount or quantity of 
any article, commodity or merchandise to be manufactured, mined, 
produced or sold in this State is hereby declared illegal. 
 265. Act No. 90, 1892 La. Act 120-22. 
 266. See id. 
 267. Id. at §§ 2–3. 
 268. Id. at § 7. 
 269. In State v. McClellan, 98 So. 748, 749 (La. 1923), the Louisiana Supreme 
Court held Act 90 of 1892 (and thus Act 86 of 1890) to be superseded by Act 11, 
thus making Act 11 the only law applicable to the current matter. 
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Two elements must be established to prove that bid collusion is 
present under Act 11 of 1915: (1) the existence of a contract, combination, 
or conspiracy; and (2) the restraint of trade or commerce.270 Note that the 
reference to “restraint of trade” includes only contracts, combinations, or 
conspiracies that are unreasonable restraints of trade.271 Because proving 
concerted actions is essential to establishing a violation of Act 11, vague 
allegations of conspiracy or collusion will be vulnerable to dismissal.272 
Thus, the complaint must describe the nature of the alleged conspiracy and 
that the actions of the co-conspirators resulted in an unreasonable restraint 
to commerce. Circumstantial evidence has been determined to be 
admissible in proving an antitrust violation.273 If bid collusion had in fact 
taken place in the Win or Lose matter, then the contract involving such 
collusion would be null and void.274 Based on a review of the testimony 
set forth in U.S. v. Noe, there is little question that there was a 
“combination” of individuals in the Win or Lose matter that plotted to 
obtain mineral leases from the State.275 Based on the available evidence, 
however, it is impossible to maintain that any of the actions of the subjects 
of this article amounted to a “restraint of trade” under Act 11 of 1915. 
Speaking to the question of whether certain activity constitutes a restraint 
of trade, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that: 
The test of the illegality of a combination or an attempt to create 
a monopoly is not what the combination or attempted monopoly 
has accomplished, but what may be accomplished; not what has 
been done, but what may be done once the participants get in 
power to accomplish their purpose. If the natural tendency or 
probable effect of the combination or monopoly is the restraint of 
trade by stifling competition or to discourage enterprise and 
industry, the combination or monopoly is deemed to be 
detrimental to the public welfare and falls within the teeth of the 
law.276 
                                                                                                             
 270. See Act No. 11, 1915 La. Acts 23. 
 271. See Wolf & Co. v. Orleans Lumber Co., 149 So. 322, 324 (La. App. Orl. 
1933). 
 272. See also J.W. Rombach, Inc. v. Parish of Jefferson, 670 So.2d 1305 (La. App. 
5 Cir. 2/14/96) To this point, no Louisiana cases could be identified from the period 
of the 1930s. Thus, we rely on more recent cases to support this proposition. 
 273. Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996 (3rd Cir. 1994). 
 274. See, 1980-81 La. Op. Att’y Gen. 29 (1980) (citing Coleman v. Bossier 
City, 305 So.2d 444 (La. 1974)). 
 275. See generally United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8. 
 276. Tooke & Reynolds v. Bastrop Ice & Storage Co., 135 So. 239, 243 (La. 
1931); see also Wolf & Co., 149 So. at 325. 
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Thus, the mere fact that the Win or Lose transactions were a result of 
collusion or concerted action by the subjects of this report is not enough 
to constitute a “restraint of trade,” nor is the fact that such actions may be 
distasteful by modern moral standards sufficient to create a legal violation. 
The law requires not only collusion, but also the creation of a scheme by 
which competition is stifled. It simply cannot be said that the Win or Lose 
leases led to any stifling of the exploration for or production of oil and gas 
in Louisiana. Indeed, that industry boomed several times after the Win or 
Lose transactions had been consummated.277 Therefore, bid collusion, as 
it has been interpreted and applied by the Louisiana courts at the time of 
the Win or Lose activity, is not applicable to this matter as there was no 
restraint of trade involved. 
Further, because the available evidence indicates that all of the 
applicable laws at the time were followed with regard to the letting of these 
leases, an unreasonable restraint of trade did not occur. Certainly, other 
parties were shut out of operating mineral activities on the leased property, 
but such was accomplished pursuant to a legislatively created public bid 
process. To the extent that the leases herein can be said to restrain trade by 
their nature (i.e., restricting the area to competitive mineral activities), then 
such is a legally sanctioned restraint, which cannot be unlawful.278 With 
the foregoing said, in the interest of completeness, because bid collusion 
is one of the few laws that can rely on circumstantial evidence as a basis 
for upsetting contracts, a further examination of the viability of such an 
action is here undertaken.279 
Although not specified in Louisiana antitrust law, it has been 
determined that the prescriptive period for monopoly and antitrust claims 
is the same as that for tort actions; therefore, the prescriptive period of 
 277. See, e.g., Robert Gramling & William R. Freudenburg, A Closer Look at 
“Local Control”: Communities, Commodities, and the Collapse of the Coast, in 
55 RURAL SOCIOLOGY 541, 543–46 (1990) (discussing the 1970s-1980s oil boom 
in Louisiana and the historic rise in oil-related activities and economies in 
Louisiana from the 1940s through the 1980s); Boris Morozov, Budgeting 
Practices and Experiences in Louisiana: From the Traditional 1990s to the 
Dramatic 2000s, in 25 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCOUNTING & FIN. MGMT. 243, 
244–45 (2013) (noting a post-Katrina/Rita oil boom in Louisiana). 
 278. In this regard, the Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that Act 11 of 1915 
was not intended to restrain lawful activity that acts as a restraint to trade. State v. 
Am. Sugar Refining Co., 71 So. 137, 144–45 (La. 1916). 
 279. This examination assumes that the circumstances that a lease was 
awarded by a governor (Allen or Noe) to a business partner (Burton) who 
immediately reassigned the lease to a joint venture of the two (Win or Lose) would 
constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a bid collusion cause of 
action absent any other mitigating problems to proving those circumstances (of 
which there are several in this situation that are reviewed in Part V). 
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such a claim is one year.280 In State ex rel. Ieyoub v. Bordens, Inc.,281 the 
State filed a parens patriae petition against a milk supplier pursuant to the 
antimonopoly statute, alleging bid-rigging in connection with school milk 
contracts.282 The petition alleged a bid-rigging scheme that affected the 
ability of the schools to receive fair, competitive bids and to pay 
competitive prices on milk sold to Louisiana schools.283 The court 
determined that the one year prescriptive period of the antitrust law, La. 
R.S. 51:121, et seq., applied to this case.284 The one-year tort period runs 
from the time the plaintiff acquired sufficient knowledge of the offense to 
realize there was an injury.285 This “sufficient knowledge of the offense” 
concept is akin to the theory of contra non valentum.286 Although 
Louisiana courts have recognized this theory,287 prescription commences 
from the point at which the plaintiff became aware of the wrong.288 In this 
case, based upon the extremely vocal opposition to the Win or Lose leases 
 280. Lee v. City of Shreveport, 58 So.3d 601, 605–06 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/2/11), 
writ denied, 62 So.3d 114 (La. 4/29/11). In Delta Theaters, Inc. v. Paramount 
Pictures, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. La. 1958), appeal dismissed, 259 F.2d 563 
(5th Cir. 1958), the court stated that actions under federal antitrust laws for 
damages were “tort” actions within purview of former Article 3537 of the 1870 
Civil Code, requiring such actions to be brought within one year. See also State 
ex rel. Ieyoub v. Bordens, Inc., 684 So.2d 1024 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/27/96), writ 
denied, 690 So.2d 42 (La. 3/14/97). Similarly, the Louisiana Second Circuit has 
concluded that “[w]hether categorized as a monopoly [sanctioned by the antitrust 
law] or a general delictual act, both classifications lend themselves to a one-year 
prescriptive period.” Lee, 58 So.3d at 606. 
 281. 684 So.2d 1024 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/27/96), writ denied, 690 So.2d 42 
(La. 3/14/97). 
282. Id. at 1026. 
283. Id. 
284. Citing Loew’s Inc. v. Don George, Inc., 110 So.2d 553 (La. 1959); 
Delaughter v. Borden Co., 364 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1966) and Diliberto v. Cont’l 
Oil Co., 215 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. La. 1963). Borden argued that prescription runs 
where the State asserts claims in its parens patriae capacity and here the one year 
prescriptive period had run. The Attorney General countered that prescription 
does not run against the State based on LA. CONST. art. XII, sec. 13, which 
declares that “prescription shall not run against the state in any civil matter unless 
otherwise provided in the constitution or expressly by law.” The court reasoned 
that a parens patriae action brought by the State on behalf of its citizens has 
elements of private and public enforcement. Even in federal cases, the passage of 
the four-year period under federal law is used to bar actions by the states. See 
Texas v. Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d 1526 (5th Cir. 1988). 
285. Delaughter, 215 F. Supp. at 864. 
286. Doctrine of Contra Non Valentem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 287. See, e.g., Hazelwood Farm, Inc. v. Liberty Oil and Gas Corp., 844 So. 2d 
380 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/2/03), writ denied, 857 So. 2d 476 (La. 10/31/03). 
 288. Id. See also Doctrine of Contra Non Valentem, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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since its inception,289 it is impossible to say that a contra non valentum-
type theory would act to meaningfully extend the brief antitrust 
prescriptive period in this matter. 
Since the alleged collusion resulted in the issuance of potentially null 
and void State leases still in operation, this article must explore whether 
such an action has set in motion a “continuous tort” on which prescription 
does not begin until the conduct causing the damages is abated.290 
However, in order for a case to qualify as a continuing tort, the conduct 
causing the damage must be continuous in nature, not the damages.291 In 
this situation, the conduct occurred in the 1930s. Thus, the time within 
which to bring an action for a violation of the antitrust laws, such as bid 
collusion, has long passed. Thus, even if Act 11 could be used to invalidate 
the Win or Lose leases if they were found to result from activity prohibited 
by that Act, the jurisprudence clearly demonstrates that any such action 
has prescribed. However, it does not appear that the activity of those 
involved in this inquiry even rises to the level of bid collusion sufficient 
to trigger the application of Act 11 to this matter. 
D. Fraud 
There is no specific provision in the Louisiana Criminal Code that 
covers a “crime of fraud,” per se. In the absence of an explicit crime of 
fraud or a criminal definition of fraud, courts look to the relevant civil law 
at the time. In the current Louisiana Civil Code, fraud is defined as “a 
misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the intention 
either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a loss or 
inconvenience to the other.”292 This article did not come into effect until 
the Louisiana Civil Code was revised in 1984. However, the Revision 
Comments to Louisiana Civil Code article 1953 state that: “[t]his Article 
is new. It does not change the law, however. It restates the definition found 
in C.C. Art. 1847(6) (1870).”293 Thus, the legal definition in place at the 
times relevant to this research would have been essentially the same as the 
definition found in the current Louisiana Civil Code article 1953. 
 289. See, e.g., W.R. Lence, Noe-Allen Oil and Gas Deals Reviewed, THE 
SHREVEPORT TIMES, Nov. 22, 1935, at 1–2; Charge Allen Profited in Land Lease, 
MORNING ADVOCATE, Nov. 28, 1935, at 5. 
 290. S. Cent. Bell Tel. v. Texaco, Inc., 418 So.2d 531, 533 (La. 1982). See also 
Benton, Benton & Benton v. La. Pub. Facilities Auth., 672 So.2d 720, 723 (La. 
App. 1 Cir. 4/4/96), writ denied, 679 So.2d 110 (La. 9/13/96). 
 291. Lee v. City of Shreveport, 58 So.3d 601, 605 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/2/11), 
writ denied, 62 So.3d 114 (La. 4/29/11). 
292. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1953. 
293. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1953, cmt. a. 
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Because there was no “crime of fraud” in the 1930s, it is somewhat 
irrelevant to discuss the elements of such crime.294 However, parsing out 
the civil elements of fraud, a fraudulent party would have to be found to 
have made a misrepresentation or suppressed the truth in an attempt to 
gain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause loss or inconvenience 
to another.295 As has been noted throughout this article, because there is 
no indication that the State received anything less than its statutorily-
guaranteed royalty share of 12.5% from the Win or Lose leases, “loss or 
inconvenience” is unlikely to be proven as against the State’s interests. 
Such an allegation would rest on speculation that the State would have 
received a more advantageous bid and lease terms had the Burton and Noe 
bids been rejected. Yet, that is not possible to know. 
Whether the Win or Lose leases satisfy the other component of fraud 
again requires evidence that is not present. Clearly, Burton and Noe 
obtained an advantage with these leases. The question lies with whether 
the advantage was unjust. They did not, as is shown herein, break any laws 
at the time (nor is there evidence of such activity) to obtain this advantage. 
Thus, it is hard to say that the advantage was unjust. Also necessary to 
succeed on this theory, it would have to be proven that Burton and Noe 
made “misrepresentation[s] or . . . sup[p]ress[ed] . . . the truth” to obtain 
the advantage.296 Although it is possible to infer such misrepresentations 
or suppressions, no clear evidence of such activity has been identified. 
With respect to these requirements, the lack of proof is a virtual bar to 
utilizing a fraud theory in either a criminal or a civil sense as against any 
of the Win or Lose leases. It is possible that fraudulent receipt of the 
subject mineral leases could invalidate them under a theory that such 
activity was contrary to the morals of the 1930s (contra bonos mores) or 
due to the fact that fraud is a vice of consent.297 However, this is a 
problematic prospect as morality and values have adapted over time, 
making morality judgment calls on what was and was not acceptable in 
the 1930s largely speculative. In many ways, the idea that laws exist to 
designate a distinction between morality and immorality complicates 
matters with regard to the Win or Lose situation.298 In this regard, the 
question remains whether the laws have already set the bounds of morality. 
If so, then by virtue of the Legislature not barring such activity, the actions 
of those related to the Win or Lose matter may have been deemed moral 
 294. It is important to note in this regard that several of the other legal theories 
reviewed herein were likely surrogates for an actual crime of “fraud” in the 1930s. 
295. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1953. 
296. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1953. 
297. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1948. 
298. JACQUES P. THIROUX & KEITH W. KRASEMANN, ETHICS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 8–10 (Glencoe 1977). 
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at the time (although distasteful by modern standards). Alecia Long, 
addressing the changing of social mores over time, provided that, “it was 
simply assumed that in order to get deals done a certain amount of graft 
would be taken off the top of any particular deal.”299 Indeed, a recent 
publication has discussed the differing moral standards of the 1920s and 
1930s from other American periods, making any morality determination 
with regard to the Win or Lose matter tenuous and complex at best.300 
Thus, the prospect of getting at objective measures of morality, at least 
using existing methodologies, is impossible.301 Thus, it is difficult to 
conceive the question regarding the morality of individuals being put 
before a court. In fact, this reality harkens to the admonition of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court in McGuigin v. Ochiglevich that courts should 
not dabble in divining the morality of certain activities.302 In addition to 
the inherent difficulties in divining moral judgments from more than seven 
decades ago, the data on public opinion from that period (which is a 
presumptively reasonable surrogate for morality if the correct questions 
are asked) has internal problems and has scarcely been analyzed to date.303 
Thus, making analyses of the Win or Lose activities by comparison to 
other data is practically impossible at this time. However, under either 
theory, proof of Win or Lose receiving interests in the leases by fraud is 
necessary and such proof has not been identified sufficient to support a 
legal cause of action. 
E. Were there Violations of the Bid Process in the 1930s with the Win or 
Lose Leases? 
As noted throughout this article, it is not sufficient that the Win or 
Lose leases were let in a manner that does not comport with the public 
leasing of minerals today. Rather, in order for these leases to be considered 
ill-gotten gains by the former governors and their associates, the leasing 
must have violated the law in force at the time. This subpart addresses the 
question of what was the law of public mineral leasing at the time of the 
Win or Lose leases. 
299.  Zurik one, supra note 3. 
 300. See generally Melissa E. Weinbrenner, Movies, Model Ts, and Morality: 
The Impact of Technology on Standards of Behavior in the Early Twentieth 
Century, in 44 J. OF POPULAR CULTURE, 647 (2011). 
301. Gabriel Abend, Two Main Problems in the Sociology of Morality, 37 
THEORY AND SOC’Y 87 (2008). 
302. 18 La. Ann. 92 (La. 1866). 
 303. See Adam J. Berinsky, American Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s: 
The Analysis of Quota-Controlled Sample Survey Data, in 70 PUBLIC OPINION Q. 499 
(2006). 
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1. What Were the Steps and Were They Followed?
John Madden has characterized the pre-1936 law related to mineral 
leasing from the State as: “confusing, left much to conjecture, and 
appeared to vest too much authority in the Governor.”304 Nonetheless, it is 
this pre-1936 mineral lease law that governs the leases acquired by the 
Win or Lose Corporation that are the subject of this article. 
A series of legislative acts embodied the statutory standards governing 
the issuance of oil and gas leases in 1934 through 1936. Before the passage 
of Acts 1928, No. 9 (Extraordinary Session), the Governor of Louisiana 
was unilaterally authorized to lease State lands for oil and gas development 
and enjoyed virtually complete discretion in providing for the terms and 
conditions of the leases.305 With a few minor exceptions, the controlling 
law for mineral leasing at the time of the letting of the Win or Lose leases 
was governed by Acts 1915, No. 30 (Act 30). In pertinent part, that law 
stated that, upon receiving an application for a mineral lease on State land: 
[T]he Governor may cause to be published in the official journal 
of the State and in the official journal of the parish wherein such 
land is located and advertisement to be published for a period of 
not less than fifteen days, setting forth therein a description of the 
land to be leased by the State, the time when bids therefor will be 
received, a short summary of the terms and conditions of the lease 
or leases to be executed, and, in his discretion, the royalty to be 
demanded should he deem it to the interests of the State to call for 
bids on the basis of a royalty fixed by him . . . .306 
This law was amended by Acts 1926, No. 315 (Act 315), but the 
amendment resulted in only minor changes. This latter law stated that, 
after the fifteen days noted in Act 30, the Governor was vested with full 
authority to: 
[E]xecute any lease or leases so granted, to the highest bidders 
therefor, under such terms and conditions as to him seem proper; 
provided that the minimum royalties to be stipulated in such leases 
304. JOHN L. MADDEN, FEDERAL AND STATE LANDS IN LOUISIANA 415 (1973). 
 305. See Act No. 30, 1915 La. Acts 62–63; Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 606-
07, and Act No. 9, 1930 La. Acts 27 (passed by the 1928 Extraordinary Legislative 
Session). See also Letter from Gaston L. Porterie, Attorney General, to Oscar K. 
Allen, Governor (Jan. 23, 1936) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice) (opining on 
the broad discretion of the Governor to grant mineral leases prior to the creation 
of the State Mineral Board). See also William O. Bonin, Public Mineral Leasing 
in Louisiana, 27 TUL. L. REV. 246, 246–47 (1953). 
306. See Act No. 30, § 3, 1915 La. Acts 63. 
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to be paid by the State shall be one-eighth of all the oil and gas 
produced and saved from the property leased . . . .307 
In 1928, the Register of State Lands acquired the authority to adjust, 
settle, and determine, by agreement with the lessee and with the approval 
of the Governor, all matters arising from the interpretation of oil and gas 
leases granted by the State of Louisiana.308 The 1928 Act was limited in 
scope and did not otherwise change any of the standards prescribed in the 
1915 and 1926 acts, since it only amended section 1 of Act 30.309 Thus, 
there were few standards imposed on the unilateral authority of Governors 
Allen and Noe when they executed the subject mineral leases from 1934 
through 1936. These standards, or the lack thereof, remained in force until 
the Legislature changed the law in 1936 and created the Louisiana State 
Mineral Board.310 Nonetheless, this legislative activity occurred 
subsequent to the issuance of the subject leases. 
Based upon the law in force at the time, the Governor, under Act 30, 
had discretion to advertise mineral leases.311 Thus, because such 
advertisements were not mandatory, it is irrelevant whether the Win or 
Lose leases were advertised. Further, Act 315 set the minimum royalty for 
State leases at 12.5%, but none of these Acts, including Act 30, required 
the payment of a bonus or rental for mineral leases on State property.312 
Accordingly, the 12.5% royalty interest reserved to the State in the Win or 
Lose leases was consistent with the law in force at the time. Finally, Act 9 
of the 1928 Extraordinary Session conferred on the State Land Office only 
the authority to modify mineral leases when questions of interpretation 
arose. This Act did not curtail the Governor’s plenary authority to grant 
leases on terms that he deemed proper, in his discretion. Due to the lack of 
standards for the issuance of mineral leases that existed at the time that the 
Win or Lose leases occurred, there is no indication that these leases were 
issued in contravention of the appropriate legal requirements at the time. 
Another matter to consider in tandem with the granting of the leases is 
whether the assignments of these leases to third parties—the manner in 
which the Win or Lose Corporation obtained its interests in the subject 
leases—were accomplished in a manner consistent with the law. Prior to the 
creation of the State Mineral Board, there was no legislation in Louisiana 
307. Act No. 315, § 4, 1926 La. Acts 607. 
 308. See Act No. 9, 1930 La. Acts 27 (passed by the 1928 Extraordinary 
Legislative Session). 
309. Id.; see also Act No. 30, 1915 La. Acts 63; Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 606–
07. 
310. See Act No. 93, 1936 La. Acts. 276–80. 
 311. Act No. 30, § 3, 1915 La. Acts 63. The authority is discretionary based 
upon the presence of the term “may” in Section 3 of that Act. 
312. Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 606–07. 
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that controlled or restricted the assignment of State mineral leases.313 
Accordingly, in the absence of any law controlling or restricting such 
transfers or assignments, it cannot be said that those assignments were 
prohibited. Further, there are no obligations imposed upon the Governor or 
any instrumentality of the State to adhere to any such nonexistent rules. It is 
probable that the Governor or other State signatory to such assignments was 
bound by a general fiduciary duty to the State in undertaking such 
assignments. However, as is set forth throughout the article, because the 
State has always received at least its minimum legal royalty share from the 
subject leases, it is impossible to now conclude, that any assignments of 
these leases constituted a derogation of any fiduciary duty to the State. 
Further, in the absence of law to the contrary, as long as such assignments 
or transfers did not adversely impact the State’s 12.5% royalty share, the 
activities were agreements among private parties. There was no requirement 
that the State approve said assignments nor even be notified of the 
assignments. The lack of notice to the State and the essentially private nature 
of those agreements are likely the reasons for the absence of some 
assignments in the State’s records (e.g., the assignment of the Win or Lose 
interest in State Lease 195)—they simply were not sent to the State because 
there was no requirement to do so. 
2. Were These Leases the Most Advantageous Leases to the State? 
The question of whether a particular mineral lease is most 
advantageous to the State is one that delves into the discretion of those 
with authority to grant the leases. Today, the State Mineral and Energy 
Board (SMEB) exercises such discretion.314 The SMEB benefits from a 
staff of well-trained scientists, engineers, geographers, and accountants 
                                                                                                             
 313. A review of the relevant law in force at the time of the Win or Lose leases 
is indicative of this reality. See Act No. 30, § 3, 1915 La. Acts 62-63; Act No. 
315, 1926 La. Acts 606-07; and Act No. 9, 1930 La. Acts 27 (passed by the 1928 
Extraordinary Legislative Session), none of which contain any language related 
to mineral lease assignments. Indeed, Madden echoes this lack of a requirement 
prior to 1936. MADDEN, supra note 304, at 423. Further, Madden also notes of the 
1936 law that, 
[I]t is recognized that a contention could be made, whether supportable 
or not in law, that a transfer or assignment, in whole or in part, of a lease, 
duly executed by the parties, is a firm contract, fait accompli in itself, 
and that the legislature was without right within the sphere of its powers 
to make such contract subject to State Mineral Board approval. 
Id. Thus, although the requirement for the Mineral Board to approve assignments 
has been embodied in law since 1936, the enforceability and utility of such actions 
is questionable. 
 314. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:127. 
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who are able to evaluate the bids and advise the Board regarding the 
advantages of particular bids to the State. 
During the examined time period, 1934–1936, the Governor held the 
sole and complete discretion as to whether a particular lease should be 
granted—a reality that carried with it the authority to decide if a particular 
bid and resulting lease was the most advantageous to the State. Without 
being able to interview any of the governors that were involved in the 
leasing from this period, it is impossible to know what factors entered into 
their analyses of the bids related to the Win or Lose Corporation.315 Some 
seventy-plus years from the discretionary decisions that led to the granting 
of the subject leases, the only means to examine the reasonableness (which 
presumably should provide some insight into the advantageousness) of 
these leases is to look to the numbers themselves. In furtherance of this 
goal, data on all leases let by the State for a ten-year period surrounding 
the subject leases (i.e., five years prior to 1934 and five years after 1936, 
or 1929 through 1941)316 were collected and statistically examined in order 
to obtain a better understanding of the relationship of these leases to others 
at the time. 
During the period examined, 1929 through 1941, the State let 267 
mineral leases.317 These leases span the terms of seven governors—Huey 
P. Long, Alvin O. King, Oscar K. Allen, James A. Noe, Richard W. Leche, 
Earl K. Long, and Sam H. Jones. These leases also span the creation of the 
State Mineral Board in 1936. The data analyzed for this inquiry include 
the size (acreage) of the leases and the per-acre bid price in order to 
determine whether the subject leases were inconsistent with other leases 
at the time. 
Generally, per-acre prices for mineral leases from the State during the 
examined twelve-year period were often quite low (with a statistically-
corrected median per acre price of $2.54).318 Further, the size of state 
 315. An interesting historical side note to this reality comes from the hearsay 
testimony of Earle J. Christenberry in the U.S. v. Noe trial, in which he commented 
that both Long and Noe, at least with respect to State Lease No. 309, were 
convinced that the royalties expected to be generated for the State by that lease 
would constitute an important economic boon for the State. Thus, although the 
requirement for the Mineral Board to approve assignments has been embodied in 
law since 1936, the enforceability and utility of such actions is questionable. See 
generally United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8 (citing testimony of 
Earle J. Christenberry). 
 316. The period of time captured for this review actually amounts to twelve 
years, because five years prior to the formation of the Win or Lose Corporation 
(1934) were examined and five years after the end of Governor Noe’s term in 
office (1936) were examined, thus providing twelve-years’ worth of data. 
 317. These leases are sequentially numbered between State Lease No. 219 and 
State Lease No. 509. 
318. See Seidemann, et al., supra note 4. 
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mineral leases during the examined twelve-year period were often also 
quite low.319 This reality is borne out by the median size for this twelve-
year period being 500 acres.320 
In the size examination, three leases—State Leases 318, 335, and 
340—were all found to be significantly larger than the other leases issued 
by the State during the subject time period.321 It is unclear whether the 
governors issuing these leases abused their discretion by issuing leases that 
were so large as to not be in the best interests of the State. Certainly, these 
three leases are significantly larger than all of the others, but there were no 
size restrictions on State leases at the time. 
The first-time size restrictions were imposed on the public officials 
responsible for issuing leases was in Acts 1936, No. 93 (Act 93).322 The 
Act added sixteen sections to the original Acts 1915, No. 30 and repealed 
all of the previous conflicting provisions.323 Section 7 of Act 93 prohibited 
the issuance of leases greater than 10,000 acres.324 Had the per-acre price 
for the leases been significantly lower than others at the time and the lease 
size been significantly higher, it would be much easier to conclude that 
such lease terms were unreasonable. However, that is not the case here. 
The governors had the discretion to grant such large leases and it cannot 
be said that the State did not get a reasonable price for these large areas. 
Thus, even for State Leases 318, 335, and 340, it cannot be concluded that 
the best interests of the State were not served by the granting of unusually 
large leases. 
On the whole, the statistical analyses undertaken as part of this project 
lead to a conclusion that the Win or Lose leases were not unreasonable based 
on the other leases that the State granted at the time. There is uncertainty 
regarding the meaning of the larger sizes of State Leases 318, 335, and 340; 
however, no direct line can be drawn between these large sizes and an 
inference that an abuse of discretion occurred such that the leases were 
invalid. Clearly, as to the price per acre that the State received, there was 
nothing out of the ordinary when the Win or Lose leases are compared to all 
of the leases from the subject time period. With the questionable nature of 
the meaning of lease size results and the suggestion from the per-acre price 
results that the Win or Lose leases were reasonable at the time, it is unlikely 
that the governors that issued these leases did so on unreasonable terms or 
abused their discretion in so issuing the leases. In the case of the subject 
leases, the provisions of Act 30 governed the issuance of oil and gas leases 
                                                                                                             
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 84. 
 321. Id. at 87. 
 322. See Act No. 93, 1936 La. Acts. 276-80. 
 323. Id. at § 21. 
 324. Id. at § 7. 
130 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. V 
 
 
 
on State owned land. Because Governors Allen and Noe granted the leases 
prior to the acreage restrictions of Act 93, there were no acreage limitations 
when the subject leases were issued. Thus, the larger-sized leases, such as 
State Leases 318, 335, and 340, were lawful. 
F. Public Bribery and Corrupt Influencing 
Some allegations suggested that W.T. Burton acquired the subject 
leases by way of bribing or unlawfully influencing O.K. Allen and James 
A. Noe. The alleged bribing suggests that Burton enticed Allen and Noe 
to issue the leases to him (Burton) by agreeing to assign a portion of the 
royalties to the Win or Lose Corporation.325 Such activity may have 
occurred, but there is no extant proof that this was the case. Nonetheless, 
this article reviews the applicable bribery and corrupt influencing laws and 
discusses what would be necessary to prove such allegations. 
A general bribery statute was passed in Louisiana in 1878, followed 
by a similar statute enacted in 1890. In order to constitute public bribery, 
the bribe given or received must be to influence one of the parties named 
in Acts 1890, No. 78.326 A mutual agreement as to the purpose of the bribe 
is not necessary, so long as the defendant alone has that purpose. In State 
v. Dudoussat, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that public bribery 
according to the 1890 statute is made up of two separate offenses—that of 
receiving, and that of giving, the bribe to influence one of the parties 
named in the statute.327 Finally, the act committed in pursuance of the bribe 
does not have to be a legal act or an act within the official power and duty 
of the official bribed; the act only needs to be related to the bribed official’s 
position, employment, or duty.328 
Acts 1890, No. 78 embodied the statutory authority relating to bribery 
of public officials. The law provided that: 
[A]ny person who shall directly or indirectly offer or give any sum 
or sums of money, bribe, present, reward, promise or any other 
thing to any officer, State, parochial or municipal, or to any 
member or officer of the General Assembly with intent to induce 
or influence such officer, or member of the General Assembly to 
appoint any person to office, to vote or exercise any power in him 
                                                                                                             
 325. Lee Zurik, Lee Zurik Investigation: Who’s Still Making Money from ‘Dirty 
Deeds’?, Fox 8 WVUE, May 8, 2012, fox8live.com/story/18169793/lee-zurik-
investigation [https://perma.cc/8KU6-RF8F] [hereafter Zurik two]. 
 326. See J.N.H., Criminal Law–Bribery of a Public Officer, 5 LA. L. REV. 327, 
327 (1943). These named parties are: “any officer, State, parochial or municipal, or to 
any member or officer to the General Assembly . . . .” Act No. 78, 1890 La. Acts 62. 
 327. 17 So. 685, 687 (La. 1895). 
 328. See, e.g., State v. Addison, 64 So. 497, 498–99 (La. 1914). 
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vested, or to perform any duty in him required with partiality or 
favor, the person giving or offering to give, directly or indirectly, 
and the officer or member of the General Assembly so receiving 
or agreeing to receive any money, bribe, present, reward, promise, 
contract, obligation or security, with the intent or for the purpose 
or consideration aforesaid, shall be guilty of bribery, and on 
conviction thereof shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less 
than one nor more than five years, and fined not less than fifty nor 
more than five thousand dollars.329 
Since 1936, corrupt influencing has been considered a separate crime 
from bribery. Acts 1920, No. 162 amended part of the original corrupt 
influencing Acts 1878, No. 59, entitled, “An Act for the prevention and 
punishment of bribery and corrupt practices in all legislative, judicial, or 
ministerial offices.”330 The law of corrupt influencing at the time of the 
subject lease issuances in 1934 through 1936 included the following 
provision: 
That any person who obtains or seeks to obtain money or other thing 
of value from another person upon a pretense, claim or 
representation that he can or will improperly influence in any 
manner, by any means direct or indirect, the official action of any 
judge . . . or other officer of this State, ministerial or judicial . . . 
shall be guilty of a felony . . . .331 
In order to establish a bribery claim, the State must prove that something 
of value was given to a State officer in order to influence that officer to 
exercise some vested power.332 In regard to Win or Lose, the vested power 
would be the granting of a State lease. Presumably, the “something of value” 
would be the promise by W.T. Burton to assign a portion of the granted leases 
to an entity in which the grantor held an interest. Although such assignments 
did occur and such a motive can be inferred, there is no proof of such a motive. 
Indeed, the available information from Noe’s tax evasion trial seems to 
indicate just the opposite: that Burton was sought out by Long, Allen, and Noe 
as someone with experience in oil and gas operations and as someone with 
the capital to finance the exploration and production of the Win or Lose 
leases.333 Yet, such a scenario substantially undercuts an allegation that 
329. Act No. 78, 1890 La. Acts 62. 
330. Act No. 162, 1920 La. Acts 252 (amending Act No. 59, 1878 La. Acts 97). 
331. Act No. 162, 1920 La. Acts 252. 
332. See id. 
333. See generally United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8 (citing 
testimony of William T. Burton). 
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Burton bribed public officials to obtain a benefit. Further, no evidence to the 
contrary exists. 
The applicability of the crime of corrupt influencing also does not 
apply to the Win or Lose situation. As noted above, corrupt influencing 
laws in the 1930s were intended to criminalize someone obtaining 
something of value for a promise to unlawfully influence a public official. 
There is no indication in the Win or Lose scenario that anyone accepted 
anything of value on a promise to unlawfully influence the awarding of 
State leases. In addition, the Win or Lose Corporation, through its later 
iteration, Independent Oil & Gas Company, was liquidated in 1951 and no 
longer exists as a potential defendant.334 Thus, this law is irrelevant to the 
current analysis. 
G. Conspiracy 
Among the many allegations circulating involving the Win or Lose 
matter, conspiracy is an oft-repeated refrain. The current criminal law 
covering conspiracy is codified at La. R.S. 14:26. That law, which was 
amended to its current form in 1950, 1977, and 2013, was preceded by one 
provision that was in force during the Win or Lose period in question: Acts 
1934 (3d E.S.), No. 2. This 1934 law criminalized the conspiracy of 
defrauding the State of taxes and revenues.335 A conspiracy, refers to the 
collusion of more than one individual to accomplish unlawful activity.336 
Unlike attempt, conspiracy is a stand-alone, actionable crime.337 As is 
evident from numerous sources cited herein and otherwise consulted in 
this research, there is no doubt that more than one person colluded in the 
Win or Lose activities. Indeed, at one time or another, as many as ten 
natural or juridical persons may have been involved in the actions that the 
Win or Lose Corporation undertook with regard to mineral leasing from 
 334. Some concept of extending any potentially available criminal penalties 
against the corporation (or an individual) to the heirs of that corporation’s interests 
is likely prohibited by the United States Constitution as an in personem forfeiture, 
which has been identified as a type of bill of attainder. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, 
cl. 3. See also Bruce A. Baird & Carolyn P. Vinson, RICO Pretrial Restraints and 
Due Process: The Lessons of Princeton/Newport, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1009, 
1010 n.3 (1990). 
 335. Act No. 2, 1934 La. Acts 15 (passed by the Third Extraordinary 
Legislative Session). 
336. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:26. 
 337. Id. See also State v. Bagneris, 110 So.2d 123 (La. 1959); State v. Gunter, 
23 So.2d 305 (La. 1945). 
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the State.338 Thus, one element of conspiracy is undoubtedly satisfied as to 
the Win or Lose State leases. 
An allegation of criminal conspiracy for the acquisition of the Win or 
Lose leases requires the consideration of whether a criminal act was 
accomplished by the above-noted collusion.339 Because there is no proof 
that the State was actually defrauded of revenues by the actions of the Win 
or Lose-related individuals, and because no positive law has been 
identified from the period of inquiry, it cannot be said that the actions of 
the individuals associated with Win or Lose constituted criminal acts. In 
addition, even if such an act is considered a criminal violation today, 
retroactive application of substantive criminal law is impermissible.340 
Therefore, this law is inapplicable to the instant scenario. 
H. Lease Nullification for Immoral Object 
The most viable remaining theory would be that of nullifying the Win 
or Lose leases on the basis that the agreement to grant such a lease had an 
immoral object. In Rosenblath v. Sanders, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
made clear that, under article 1892 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, a 
contract that has an immoral object is void.341 As previously noted, the 
current governmental ethics laws were not in place during the relevant 
time periods. However, the lack of a positive law prohibiting certain action 
does not necessarily prevent a finding that the actions of Governors Allen 
 338. See generally United States v. Noe Trial Transcript, supra note 8. The ten 
referenced parties are: Huey P. Long, Oscar K. Allen, James A. Noe, Seymour 
Weiss, Earle J. Christenberry, Alice Lee Grosjean, William T. Burton, M. S. 
Rhodes, J. E. Farrell, and the Win or Lose Corporation. 
339. See State v. D’Ingianni, 47 So.2d 731 (La. 1950). 
 340. A discussion of this principle was set forth by the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Janecka v. Cockrell: 
The Ex Post Facto Clause provides that “[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . ex 
post facto law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl.1. Although the text of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause makes clear that it only limits the powers of legislatures, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged a similar limitation on the power of the 
judiciary to render decisions that retroactively criminalize previously legal 
conduct. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 
260 (1977) (holding retroactive application of Supreme Court case violated 
defendants’ due process rights because it punished conduct that had been 
considered innocent under previous case law); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 
378 U.S. 347, 353, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) (holding that “an 
unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied 
retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law” and is prohibited 
by the Due Process Clause). 
301 F.3d 316, 322 n.9 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 341. 150 La. 882, 883-84 (La. 1922). The laws discussed in this case were the 
laws in force in 1936. 
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and Noe and W.T. Burton were nevertheless immoral, thus resulting in the 
invalidation of these contracts. 
In order to establish immorality, it must first be proven that at least a 
portion of the object of the granting of the leases was to obtain an improper 
financial benefit or that some law was violated. Obviously, the mere act of 
entering into a mineral lease agreement is not inherently immoral, but the 
analysis for this situation is more nuanced than a simple inquiry into 
whether mineral leasing is, per se, immoral. The Louisiana Supreme Court 
explained this concept of nullity through immorality in the 1866 case of 
McGuigin v. Ochiglevich, stating: 
It is not pretended that there is anything inherently immoral or 
essentially criminal in the art of making sails, or in the act of 
selling canvas. The trade of sail-making is in itself an eminently 
useful and honorable one; it is indispensable to commerce, to 
science, to civilization. A contract to supply canvas and sails 
involves no patent turpitude, like a contract to rob, to murder, to 
commit arson, to abet treason, which would be on its face 
iniquitous, and for the enforcement of which the law grants no 
action. It is obvious, therefore, that a distinction is to be made 
between contracts immoral sui generis and those the object of 
which is to supply, or do something which, innocent in itself, is 
intended by one or both parties to subserve a purpose reprobated 
by law or by good morals.342 
With regard to the Win or Lose leases, it is incontrovertible that 
mineral leasing by the State, in itself, is, as the McGuigin court noted 
“eminently useful.”343 In order to determine whether the Win or Lose 
leases fail the contract morality test, an inquiry into the motivations of the 
lessor (the State, through Governors Allen and Noe, and others) and the 
lessee (W.T. Burton and James A. Noe) would have to be undertaken. Had 
this been done during these individuals’ lifetimes, a similar argument 
could be made. Such an argument would roughly be that if Governors 
Allen or Noe granted a mineral lease to W.T. Burton with the constructive 
knowledge that the agreement would likely result in a financial benefit 
solely to themselves, the original contract granting the lease might be void 
for having an immoral object. Yet, these motives, cannot be supplied or 
verified. In the absence of such evidence, and with the reality that the State 
was compensated at the regular royalty rate for the time, these legal 
theories are not usable as to the current matter. 
342. 18 La. Ann. 92, 92 (La. 1866). 
343. Id. 
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Coco v. Oden also deals with a situation that involves a public official 
entering into an immoral contract based on its position.344 Here, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court was faced with a situation in which the Sheriff 
of Allen Parish accepted a free railroad pass.345 The court found that “[t]he 
contract set up by the defendant is contra bonos mores, it is immoral, and 
it is against the public policy of the state.”346 In so finding, the court held 
that the Sheriff “forfeited his office by the acceptance and use of such 
pass.”347 As one of the potential consequences of entering into an immoral 
contract as a result of one’s official position under the law of the 1930s, 
Coco provides a useless potential result for the State—O.K. Allen and 
James A. Noe left public office more than eight decades ago. Thus, their 
forfeit of office would be meaningless. 
Situations that would render a contract unlawful because it is against 
sound morals, public policy, public rights, or public interests include: 
contracts made with an alien enemy; contracts in general restraint of trade 
or marriage; contracts for the perpetration, concealment, or compounding 
of some crime; considerations impeding the course of public justice, as 
dropping a criminal prosecution for a felony, or a public misdemeanor, or 
suppressing evidence.348 Under the law of the 1930s, these examples of 
violations of public morals likely did not exist or are provable in the 
current matter. 
Regarding whether an act contra bonos mores is sufficient today to 
support an annulment of a contract—here, a State mineral lease—the 
answer is likely in the negative. In McGuigin v. Ochiglevich, the court 
categorically rejected the idea that mere “intention” would be sufficient to 
prove that something was contra bonos mores: 
344. 79 So. 287 (La. 1918). 
345. Id.  
346. Id. at 288. 
347. Id. 
348. Ozanne v. Haber, 30 La. Ann. 1384 (1878). 
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The immoral character of the contract does not result from a 
simple inspection of its terms, but is remotely deduced by a 
process of reasoning and casuistry involving questions of motive 
and intention on the part of the vendor, and of knowledge on the 
part of the vendee . . . . The whole inquiry, then, in cases of this 
kind, would turn upon questions of intention, and the investigation 
assumes a moral and metaphysical character. Attorneys at law 
become casuists. The Court is converted into a Synod of 
Theologians. The authority of Locke and Malebranche supersedes 
the authority of Pothier and Domat, and the judgment of the Court 
would present a solution of metaphysical problems, not a juridical 
sentence. It is obvious to what absurd consequences we are led by 
the doctrine of “intention” as taught by the lower Court. Civil 
magistrates should be content to limit their labors to the 
investigation and enforcement of civil contracts, and not 
complicate and confuse their duties by entering the labyrinth of 
subtleties in quest of hidden “intentions.”349 
Thus, the law presumes that the true intention of parties is clear and 
explicit on the face of their contracts, and that people, in their business 
transactions, do not intend to violate the law or to make contracts for the 
enforcement of which the law refuses a remedy. Hence, as the Louisiana 
Supreme Court has noted, “when one party charges that the contract is 
infected with an illegal intent, the burden of proof is imposed upon him to 
establish this allegation.”350 
This is a particularly problematic scenario for the Win or Lose matter, 
as evidence of any actual intent is now impossible to acquire. The leases 
bear no evidence of impropriety on their faces. As indicated, the leases are 
consistent with the law and with similar leases of the time. Thus, there 
appears to be no cause of action by the State to invalidate the Win or Lose 
leases on the grounds that the leases were a result of immoral actions. Even 
if the courts were willing to ignore the warnings of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court in McGuigin to avoid looking to the metaphysical question of intent 
to divine immorality, answering the question situation would be 
impossible since all of the parties involved in the original transactions are 
long-dead. In addition, the McGuigin court clearly articulates that, absent 
clear evidence of wrongdoing, a court will not sit in judgment as to the 
349. McGuigin v. Ochiglevich, 18 La. Ann. 92, 93 (La. 1866). 
350. Stewart Bros. v. Beeson, 148 So. 703, 705 (La. 1933). 
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morality of specific acts—such is not a judicial function.351 However, 
another basis for annulment is that the contracts were illicit. As has been 
noted at length in the above analyses, no evidence of illegality exists with 
regard to these leases. 
I. The Perez Cases 
The series of cases related to Leander Perez and his efforts to obtain 
and maintain mineral leases from various levee districts in Plaquemines 
Parish are reviewed here based upon suggestions by media reports that 
such cases may provide a legal mechanism for the State to invalidate the 
Win or Lose leases.352 However, the factual distinctions between those 
cases and the Win or Lose situation are so great as to render any holdings 
in the Perez cases useless in any effort to rescind the Win or Lose leases. 
Leander Perez, like Huey Long, is an almost mythical, larger-than-life 
figure.353 The former judge and District Attorney for Plaquemines and St. 
Bernard Parishes is best known today for his bigotry and staunch 
opposition to integration of the New Orleans area schools in the 1950s and 
 351. See, e.g., City of Shreveport v. Sw. Gas & Elec. Co., 74 So. 559 (La. 
1917) (noting that it is not a judicial function to pass judgment on the morality of 
certain legislation). Indeed, in State v. Smith, 766 So.2d 501, 509–10 (La. 7/6/00), 
the Louisiana Supreme Court implies that morality judgments are left to the 
Legislature and that the courts should examine acts only in light of those moral 
judgments made through the enactment of laws. See also Allen v. Carruth, 32 La. 
Ann. 444, 446 (La. 1880), in which the Louisiana Supreme Court notes that its 
role is in interpreting morality only through the enforcement of the existing law. 
In this regard, the court noted: 
With the motives of public policy we have nothing to do, in the absence 
of all restraint on the power of the owner in the terms of the law. If, 
however, we were at liberty through our views of public policy to go 
beyond the terms of the statute, we would hold that public morality 
would best be subserved by enforcing the performance of obligations 
legally entered into; that the interest of society and of individuals would 
best be guarded by discountenancing all attempts to procure credit by the 
renunciation of rights of property, and, after reaping the benefits of the 
credit, seek to frustrate payment by an attempted exercise of the rights 
renounced. 
Id. In the end, although the bulk of the jurisprudence suggests that courts should 
not be in the business of making moral judgment calls, it may be that in extreme 
cases, such does occur. However, it seems unlikely that courts, based upon the 
jurisprudence noted herein, would become involved in nuanced questions of 
moral issues. 
352. See, e.g., Zurik two, supra note 325. 
 353. JAMES CONAWAY, JUDGE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LEANDER PEREZ 5 
(1973). 
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1960s.354 However, long before such events, Perez was known as the boss 
of Plaquemines Parish, controlling the parish with an iron fist.355 
Within this historical framework, Perez, as the District Attorney of 
Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes, and the ex-officio attorney for the 
Buras and Grand Prairie Levee Districts, assisted those districts (from 
1936 and 1938) in leasing mineral rights on district property to Delta 
Development, Inc.356 Delta Development was a corporate entity that was 
solely held by the Perez family.357 When challenged on the issuance of 
these leases by the levee districts in the 1940s, Perez fought back, using 
political clout to obscure the true nature of Delta Development and to 
intimidate those who would challenge him.358 Perez went so far as to 
obtain grand jury indictments of several levee district members, as well as 
the then-Attorney General, Eugene Stanley, in an effort to fend off 
inquiries into his issuance of the Delta Development leases.359 For a time, 
Perez succeeded in maintaining the leases by continuing as counsel for the 
levee districts, the parishes, and for Delta Development.360 
Following Perez’s death, Plaquemines Parish (the successor-in-
interest to the Buras and Grand Prairie Levee Districts) challenged the 
validity of the Delta Development leases.361 The Louisiana Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeal dismissed the case against the Perez heirs and assigns, 
holding that prescription had run and consequently that the parties could 
not maintain their action.362 The Louisiana Supreme Court overturned the 
fourth circuit, noting that Perez’s lies to the people and the courts in the 
1930s and 1940s, in addition to his use of police power to intimidate his 
opponents, constituted a bar to prescription in this matter. Thus, the case 
was allowed to proceed.363 
 354. See generally GLEN JEANSONNE, LEANDER PEREZ: BOSS OF THE DELTA 
(La. State Univ. Press 1977); ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, RACE & DEMOCRACY: THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA, 1915–1972 (Univ. of Ga. Press 1999). 
355. CONAWAY, supra note 353, at 5. 
 356. Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council v. Delta Dev., Inc., 486 So.2d 129, 
131–32 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Plaquemines Parish Comm’n 
Council]. See also Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council v. Delta Dev., Inc., 502 
So.2d 1034, 1041–42 (La. 1987) [hereinafter Delta Dev., Inc.]. 
357. Delta Dev., Inc., 502 So.2d at 1042–43. 
358. Id. at 1046–53. 
359. Id. at 1051–52. 
360. Id. at 1046–53. 
361. See generally Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council, 486 So.2d at 131 
and Delta Dev., Inc., 502 So.2d 1034 (La. 1987). 
 362. Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council v. Delta Dev., Inc., 486 So.2d 129, 
143 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1986). 
 363. Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council v. Delta Dev., Inc., 502 So.2d 
1034, 1061–63 (La. 1987). 
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Although fascinating cases from a historical perspective, the fourth 
circuit and supreme court Perez cases from the 1980s hold no useful 
mechanisms for the State to use in a challenge to the Win or Lose leases. 
The primary reason for this lack of utility is that these cases are about 
liberative prescription, a legal theory for the extension of actions that is 
generally inapplicable to the State under La. Const. Art. XII, Sec. 13.364 
When the Delta Development matter returned to the fourth circuit in 
1997, all but one of the Perez descendants had settled their disputes with 
Plaquemines Parish.365 In this case, the court discussed some substantive 
issues of relevance to the Win or Lose matter. However, much of this case 
related to the original prescription issues—matters already determined 
inapplicable by the Louisiana Supreme Court and, once again, dismissed 
by the fourth circuit.366 
The fourth circuit addressed the issue of whether Leander Perez 
derogated his fiduciary duty to the levee districts by serving as both the 
levee districts’ attorney and Delta Development’s attorney. The court 
found that such a breach did occur and that the breach caused the leases to 
be invalid.367 This result is not relevant to the Win or Lose matter. The 
Perez court rested its decision—that Leander Perez breached his fiduciary 
duty to the levee districts—on his position as the attorney for both the 
levee districts and for Delta Development.368 Such a relationship did not 
exist in the Win or Lose matter; thus, the holding in this case is 
inapplicable. The fiduciary responsibilities of the governors in the Win or 
Lose matter were set forth by the statutorily required minimum royalties 
and lease terms for mineral leases. Further, these responsibilities were also 
created legislatively by requiring adherence of such leasing to a public bid 
process. As was noted previously, there has been no derogation of these 
duties discovered in the Win or Lose matter. 
Lastly, in the 1997 Perez case, the court examined whether the 
remaining Perez descendant, who was not found to be complicit in any of 
Leander Perez’s wrongdoings, was required to: “surrender the overriding 
royalty interests, and the monies he has derived from them, because those 
overriding royalty interests originally were acquired by his grandfather’s 
breaches of fiduciary duty.”369 The court refused to impute the guilt of the 
ancestor to the descendant. In this regard, the court stated that, “simply 
 364. See Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council, 486 So.2d at 143; Delta Dev., 
Inc., 502 So.2d at 1061–63. 
 365. Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council v. Delta Dev., Inc., 688 So.2d 169, 
172 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1997). 
366. Id. at 172–74. 
367. Id. at 174. 
368. Id. 
369. Id. at 175. 
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receiving the benefit of a fraud, without more, [does not] make[] one liable 
for the fraud.”370 However, the court did provide that the Perez descendant 
would be liable to Plaquemines Parish under a theory of unjust enrichment, 
even though he was not criminally culpable for fraud.371 This finding by 
the 1997 Perez court also is not significant to the Win or Lose matter. The 
conclusion that the one Perez heir was liable to Plaquemines Parish based 
upon his unjust enrichment was premised on the finding that the mineral 
leases were acquired from the levee districts in a fraudulent manner.372 The 
absence of proof of fraud in the acquisition of the Win or Lose leases from 
the State undermines the application of an unjust enrichment theory in the 
current matter. Indeed, because the State was not impoverished by the 
acquisition of mineral leases by the Win or Lose Corporation, there is no 
unjust enrichment. This conclusion is consistent with Judge Plotkin’s 
concurrence in the 1997 Perez matter.373 
V. MITIGATING FACTORS 
Each of the above-discussed theories is fraught with legal and 
logistical problems. This section briefly examines the most obvious of 
those problems, which largely, if not completely, defeat any attempt to 
invalidate or revoke the subject leases. 
A. Evidentiary Problems 
The primary obstacle to the State proving any case for wrongdoing 
with regard to the Win or Lose leases is the lack of evidence. If such 
wrongdoing occurred, its perpetrators did well in avoiding a paper trail 
that could represent a smoking gun from an evidentiary perspective. Thus, 
should the State bring an action for the revocation of the Win or Lose 
leases, it will be faced with the reality that it has no actual, explicit proof 
of wrongdoing. 
Because the allegation of fraud is the primary charge levied against 
the actors in the Win or Lose matter, this article will briefly review the 
proof problems inherent in a successful prosecution of that theory.374 As 
was mentioned in the review of Perrault’s 1941 Memorandum,375 fraud is 
370. Id. 
 371. Plaquemines Parish Comm’n Council v. Delta Dev., Inc., 688 So.2d 169, 
175 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1997). 
372. Id. at 176. 
373. Id. at 176–77. 
374. The proof problems for the other theories reviewed herein are set forth in 
their respective sections of this article. 
375. See generally textual discussion supra part II.B.3. 
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not presumed and the burden of proving it is high. In Hall v. Arkansas-
Louisiana Gas Co.,376 the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that, “[i]t is well 
settled that one who alleges fraud has the burden of establishing it by legal 
and convincing evidence since fraud is never presumed, and that to 
establish fraud exceptionally strong proof must be adduced.”377 In other 
words, although circumstantial evidence may be used to prove fraud, the 
mere insinuation and innuendo upon which the current claims of fraud and 
wrongdoing are based are not sufficient. 
Review of the paper trail in this matter revealed that it contains 
insufficient evidence of fraud or any other wrongdoing.378 Indeed, 
commenting on the possibility of fraud, years after his analysis of the 
matter for the State, C.C. Wood stated “ . . . as far as I could see, we didn’t 
have any evidence of fraud, at all.”379 There exist no inconsistencies in the 
extant lease (i.e., State Lease 340, 341, and 344) documents to support a 
fraud allegation. With no paper trail to demonstrate wrongdoing, live 
testimony is the only other option. Thus, in order to prove fraud, the State 
needs live testimony of the actors involved in the alleged fraudulent 
activity. The existing testimony from U.S. v. Noe does not evidence any 
fraud. All potential witnesses are now long dead and thus cannot be 
interviewed. The lack of evidence of fraud or of any other wrongdoing in 
this matter defeats any nonfrivolous challenge to the Win or Lose leases. 
B. Good Faith of Third Parties 
The Perrault Memorandum of July 15, 1941 reviewed the 
requirements to invalidate certain State leases vitiated with several 
irregularities: the large profits made by the original lessee resulting from 
his assignment of the lease; the typewritten bids accepted by the State; and 
the amount of the bid filled in blank places;380 the executed lease carrying 
no cash consideration as called for by the advertisement; and instances 
where a corporation in which public officials owned an interest finally 
received by assignment interests in the leases. Perrault’s analysis 
concluded that, despite the suspicious circumstances surrounding the 
execution of these leases, such circumstances did not equate to a proof of 
                                                                                                             
 376. 368 So.2d 984, 993 (La. 1978), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other 
grounds, 452 U.S. 571 (1981). 
 377. Id. 
 378. See Perrault Memorandum, supra, note 174. 
 379. Deposition of C.C. Wood, Roussel v. Noe (La. 16th J.D.C. 1980) (No. 
42,338) at 12 (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
 380. It is unclear to the authors of this article why this fact would give someone 
pause regarding the validity of the leases, but it is cited by Perrault as a concern 
and we thus repeat it here in the interest of completeness. 
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the existence of fraud. In order to cancel the leases as of their inception, 
fraud would have to be shown. Thus, there must be proof that: (1) fraud 
occurred on the part of the present lease holders; or (2) the present lease 
holders did not acquire in good faith on the face of the public records. 
Thus, in order to examine whether the current holders of the Win or 
Lose leases may be forced to give up those leases based on a lack of good 
faith, this article looks to the current law on nullity. Louisiana Civil Code 
article 2035, provides that: “Nullity of a contract does not impair the rights 
acquired through an onerous contract by a third party in good faith. If the 
contract involves immovable property, the principles of recordation apply 
to a third person acquiring an interest in the property whether by onerous 
or gratuitous title.” 
According to the 1984 revision comments, “[t]his Article is new, but 
it does not change the law.”381 The comments further note that article 2035, 
“merely articulates the doctrines of bona fide purchase and the sanctity of 
the public records.”382 The article also “reflect[s] the public policy in favor 
of security of transactions by protecting the person who acquires rights 
through a valid onerous contract from the effects of the nullity of any 
related contract between different persons.”383 In fact, this principle has 
been part of the Louisiana jurisprudence since the 1800s. In Blanchard v. 
Castille, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that, “a bona fide purchaser, 
without notice, is not affected by fraud in his vendor, who has a legal title 
to the property sold.”384 
In State v. Hackley, Hume & Joyce, the State sought to invalidate 
patents on certain lands because they were obtained through the use of 
fraudulent representations.385 The State’s prayer was that the patents, then 
owned by subsequent holders, be decreed to have been illegally obtained. 
Further, the State prayed that the patents, together with the titles of the 
defendants, be ordered erased from the records, and that the State be 
recognized as the owner of the lands and have a judgment rendered against 
the defendants ordering them to vacate the disputed property. On 
rehearing, the court concluded: 
                                                                                                             
 381. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2035, cmt. a. 
 382. Id. See Mengis, supra note 228 (discussing the importance and sanctity 
of public records in such situations). 
 383. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2035, cmt. b. 
 384. 19 La. 362, 364 (La. 1841). 
 385. 50 So. 772 (La. 1909). 
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Even though the patent itself should be invalid, by reason of the 
alleged fraud of the patentees, the several titles which constitute 
the chain of title by which the defendants are alleged to hold may 
be good, and each of them be an insurmountable barrier to the 
pretensions of the state. This is so because, where fraud has been 
committed by the patentee, the government cannot recover the 
land from a third person who has acquired it for valuable 
consideration and without notice of the fraud. Therefore, for 
showing a cause of action against the defendants, it was necessary 
that the petition should have shown that the acquisition of the 
property under each and every one of these several titles was 
without valuable consideration, or else with notice of the alleged 
fraud; in other words, connected these subsequent holders of the 
title with the fraud by proper allegations, and the petition has not 
made this showing. 
* * * 
To say that the defendants are holders in bad faith is not to allege 
a fact, but merely a conclusion of law. It is merely to say that their 
title is invalid, and that they know it. A ‘holder in bad faith’ is 
defined by the Civil Code to be he ‘who possesses as master, but 
who assumes this quality when he well knows that he has no title 
to the thing or that his title is vicious or defective.’ Civ. Code, art. 
3452.386 
Notably, bad faith is never presumed;387 thus, good faith is 
presumed.388 To overcome this presumption, it is necessary to prove that 
the purchaser acted in bad faith because he had knowledge of the 
fraudulent circumstances involving the original transaction: 
If there is doubt as to the validity of the title from whom he 
acquires, or if the person so acquiring title has knowledge of such 
facts as would render the title invalid, he cannot claim the benefit 
of a possessor in good faith.389 
386. Id. at 775 (internal citations omitted). 
387. See Breaux v. Broussard, 40 So. 639, 640 (La. 1906). 
388. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3481. 
389. Franks v. Scott, 191 So. 175, 177 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1939) (citing Knight v. 
Berwick Lumber Co., 57 So. 900 (La. 1912); Fradella v. Pumilia, 147 So. 496 (La. 
1933), rev’d on other grounds; Rauschkolb v. DiMatteo, 181 So. 555 (La. 1938)). 
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The requirement that all of the current right holders in the Win or Lose 
leases be shown to have been in bad faith at the time that they acquired 
their rights is, in some cases, impossible (due to the death of the acquirers); 
and in others, highly unlikely (most of the parties to these leases today 
relied in good faith on the public records that suggested or demonstrated 
that these leases were valid). 
With regard to the “good faith acquirers” mitigating factor, the past 
actions of the State Mineral Board, the Louisiana Attorney General’s 
Office, and private litigants are of great importance. Over time, the State 
Mineral Board, whether by resolution or by settlement of litigation, has 
ratified the validity of the Win or Lose leases. Whether these ratifications 
were sufficient to undo any wrongdoing that occurred in the acquisition of 
the leases is immaterial to this inquiry. What is material is the effect that 
those actions had on the public records and the perceptions of those who 
acquired interests and invested in the Win or Lose leases subsequent to the 
ratifications. The effect of the State Mineral Board ratifications cannot be 
understated: they put all subsequent acquirers of interests in these leases 
on notice that the State has committed itself to the validity of the leases. 
Thus, despite any existing rumors of wrongdoing in the granting of these 
leases, the public records demonstrate, that these leases were and are valid, 
and such an assertion, can be relied upon in good faith. Consequently, as 
a result of these public pronouncements, the current acquirers of interests 
in these leases are in good faith and their interests cannot be assailed by 
revoking the leases due to the presumption of good faith discussed 
above.390 
If these resolutions were not enough to assuage any concerns of 
prospective acquirers of interests in the Win or Lose leases, the several 
pronouncements of the Louisiana Attorney General Office certainly also 
contribute to the good faith of the current lease interest holders. As is 
reviewed at length in Part II(B), past Attorneys General for the State of 
Louisiana have examined the Win or Lose leases for irregularities. Some 
of these examinations revealed inconsistencies; yet, each of these 
examinations resulted in determinations that the inconsistencies were 
either unverifiable or that invalidating the Win or Lose leases was 
pointless. These decisions, which effectively became public examples of 
prosecutorial discretionary decisions not to take action for lack of evidence 
                                                                                                             
 390. See, e.g., Keller v. Summers, 187 So. 69, 71 (La. 1939) (“good faith is 
always presumed, until the contrary is shown” in commercial transactions); 
Caldwell Lands, Inc. v. Cedyco Corp., 980 So.2d 827, 829 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/2/08) 
(“Good faith is presumed” in acquisitive prescription scenarios (citing LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. art. 3481)); Cahn Bros. & Redmond, Inc. v. Terrebonne, 289 So.2d 
171, 173 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1973) (good faith is presumed in financial transactions). 
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of wrongdoing, further bolster the good faith of today’s right holders in 
these leases. 
Although none of the governmental or private litigation regarding the 
Win or Lose leases reached a final judgment by a court, the mere existence 
of the suits and their lack of finality further suggest that these leases could 
be relied upon as valid. Probably the most important of these cases is the 
litigation against Texaco.391 These acts, along with the lack of complete 
prosecution of the other cases involving the Win or Lose leases, certainly 
stands as a reliable basis for acquiring good faith rights in the Win or Lose 
leases by any and all subsequent lease interest holders. 
Therefore, even if the State were able to revoke the Win or Lose 
mineral leases, it could not invalidate the equitable rights in or effects of 
those leases to the good faith third parties who now hold rights in those 
leases. The State has continuously received what it contracted for: a 12.5% 
(or more) royalty share on any production from the Win or Lose leases. 
Thus, revocation of the leases would not result in the release of any acreage 
to potential renomination for bid nor in a return of any royalties acquired 
by the lessees, their assigns, or their heirs. 
C. The Texaco Litigation and its Implications for the Entire Win or Lose 
Matter 
In the matter of Texaco Inc., et al. v. Louisiana Land and Exploration 
Co., et al.,392 the State sued Texaco, Inc. within Texaco’s then-pending 
bankruptcy suit, alleging that the latter had violated a 1981 settlement 
agreement between the two parties over natural gas pricing disputes. The 
State further alleged that Texaco had intentionally underpaid for gas from 
other State leases not included in the 1981 settlement.393 More broadly, the 
State alleged that Texaco had been underpaying royalties on gas produced 
from forty-four State leases for approximately forty years.394 Among the 
leases involved in this lawsuit were several leases in which Texaco 
acquired an interest from W.T. Burton and/or shares of interests from the 
391. See generally discussion infra part V.C. 
392. 136 B.R. 658 (M.D. La. 1992). 
393. The 1981 litigation was entitled, State of Louisiana, ex rel. William J. 
Guste, Jr., et al. v. Texaco, Inc., et al., Docket No. 60,407, Sixteenth Judicial 
District Court, St. Mary Parish. 
 394. Statement of the Case filed by State of Louisiana, Department of Natural 
Resources and State Mineral Board, State v. Texaco, Docket No. 88-998-A (M.D. 
La., filed Jan. 8, 1989), at 4–5. 
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successors of the Win or Lose Corporation.395 Notably, that this case was 
not instituted to attack the actions of or to investigate matters related to 
W.T. Burton or Win or Lose, but rather to remedy the royalty 
underpayment allegations of the State as against Texaco.396 This does not 
mean, that the issues related to W.T. Burton and Win or Lose did not come 
up during the course of this wide-ranging and complex litigation; they 
were simply not the focus of this case or of the 1981 Texaco litigation.397 
The Texaco litigation, which was instituted in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, was associated, but not 
consolidated, with Texaco’s then-pending bankruptcy proceedings in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York.398 
After several years of litigious maneuvering in both the New York and 
Louisiana federal courts, the State, Texaco, and several other parties 
entered into mediation, which concluded in 1994 and resulted in the 
confection of the Texaco Global Settlement Agreement (GSA).399 
The GSA, in addition to settling the State’s gas royalty payment 
dispute with Texaco over the leases subject to the suit for a payment to the 
State of $250 million, also constituted ratification by the State of the leases 
 395. A bankruptcy filing by Texaco listed State Leases 334, 335, 340, and 341 
as State leases in which Texaco had an interest. Exhibit A to Motion of Texaco 
Inc. for Order Approving Assumption of Oil and Gas Agreements with State of 
Louisiana, or Alternatively, Determining that Certain Oil and Gas Agreements are 
Not Executory Contracts or Unexpired Leases for Purposes of Bankruptcy Code 
Section 365, In re: Texaco Inc, et al., Docket Nos. 87-B-20142, 87-B-20143, 87-
B-20144 (S.D.N.Y., filed Sept. 15, 1987). 
 396. See generally Amended and Restated Objection, Amended and Restated 
Proof of Claim and Complaint of the State of Louisiana, Texaco Inc., et al. v. 
Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., et al., Docket No. 88-998-A (M.D. La., filed 
July, 21, 1989). 
 397. The media reports have referred to this case as an example of Attorney 
Generals Guste and Ieyoub’s examination of the Win or Lose allegations that are 
the subject of this report and their decisions not to pursue them. As is clearly 
evident from the filings in this case, the alleged wrongdoings of W.T. Burton and 
the Win or Lose Corporation were not the subject of either this case or of the case 
that resulted in the 1981 Texaco settlement. 
 398. In re: Texaco Inc, et al., Docket Nos. 87-B-20142, 87-B-20143, 87-B-
20144 (S.D.N.Y.). Louisiana filed its suit prior to Texaco’s bankruptcy filing. See 
Statement of the Case, supra note 394, at 5. Texaco did not file its bankruptcy 
primarily to avoid liability from Louisiana’s claims. Rather, the bankruptcy was 
instituted because Texaco was unable to cover the obligations imposed upon it by 
the adverse ruling against it in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
Statement of the Case, supra note 394, at 14–15. With that said, Louisiana’s 
counsel on the Texaco litigation directly alleged that the bankruptcy was also filed 
in order to avoid certain liabilities under Texaco’s leases, including those owed to 
Louisiana for the underpayment of gas royalties. Id. at 15. 
 399. See Texaco Global Settlement Agreement (1994) (on file with the La. 
Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter GSA]. 
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subject to the suit.400 The effect of this ratification constitutes an 
acceptance of the leases and of their terms by the State in 1994. Such an 
acceptance creates a strong presumption of estoppel for the State to now 
challenge the substance and terms of those leases.401 Importantly, that the 
State did not unilaterally ratify these past leases without any consideration. 
In reality, the ratification was a necessary requirement for the State to gain 
the benefits of the underpaid royalties—the $250 million payment. In 
order to benefit from the leases, the State had to recognize and 
acknowledge the validity of the leases under which the benefits were to be 
obtained. Hence, the ratification of the leases was included as a condition 
of the GSA. 
Moreover, it would be a mischaracterization to imply that the State 
simply ratified the former W.T. Burton and Win or Lose leases (among 
others) without any reason or recompense. The reason and recompense 
was a quarter of a billion dollars;402 an agreement for Texaco to spend an 
additional $152.25 million for further development of the mineral reserves 
covered by their leases;403 an agreement for Texaco to release 33,000 acres 
from the Lighthouse Point, Mound Point, and Caillou Island Fields;404 and 
tightening Texaco’s commitment to adhere to the gas pricing requirements 
of the 1981 Compromise Agreement.405 
In addition to the confection of the GSA, the Texaco litigation also 
resulted in the creation of the Lease Protection Agreement.406 The Lease 
Protection Agreement constituted a settlement of certain State claims in 
the Texaco litigation against the overriding royalty interest owners for 
State Leases 335, 340, and 341. In the settlement, the State reserved the 
ability to, under certain circumstances, obtain higher royalty rates from 
these interest holders than had originally been bargained-for when these 
leases were let. Through this agreement, the State acquired a 20% royalty 
rate for any reassigned portions of these three State leases,407 an increase 
in the State’s royalty of 7.5% over the original royalty rate for these leases. 
                                                                                                             
 400. The cash payment is detailed in the GSA at ¶ 3, and the ratification is 
detailed in the GSA at ¶ 9. 
 401. See, e.g., Frazier v. Harper, 600 So.2d 59, 62 (La. 1992) (noting the 
effects of ratification of contracts). 
 402. GSA at ¶ 3. 
 403. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 404. Id. at ¶ 5. The releases from the Lighthouse Point and Mound Point Fields 
amounted to releases of acreage from State Lease 340. In addition to these areas, 
the State also required Texaco to release portions of the Rabbit Island, West Cote 
Blanche Bay, Horseshoe Bayou, and Bayou Sale Fields. 
 405. Id. at ¶ 7. There were additional concessions by Texaco in the GSA that 
are too detailed for a meaningful summarization in this document. The reader is 
referred to the actual language of the GSA for this information. 
 406. Lease Protection Agreement (1994) (on file with the La. Dep’t of Justice). 
 407. See id. at 11. 
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In exchange for this higher royalty rate, the State, through the State 
Mineral Board, ratified: “State Leases 334, 335, 340, and 341 and all 
Subleases thereof, and all sales and assignments of these leases by William 
T. Burton and his successors in title which have been approved by the State 
Mineral Board . . . .”408 
Thus, once again, the State Mineral Board ratified W.T. Burton and 
Win or Lose leases and assignments. This ratification effectively makes 
these leases, at least as to those individuals in W.T. Burton’s chain of title, 
invulnerable by the State today. Further, considering the effects of 
undermining or undoing the leases that are discussed below, such a 
dissolution may cause more harm than good to the State’s fisc. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section examines how the State was injured by the issuance of 
the Win or Lose leases. It then analyzes the likelihood of success of the 
possible mechanisms for invalidating the Win or Lose leases 
A. What Did The State Lose? 
Prior to embarking on an analysis of the possible legal theories to 
undermine or cancel the Win or Lose leases and their chances for success, 
it is crucial to understand what the State has lost through these leases. In 
other words, the question remains how the State fisc (and, presumably by 
extension, the people) has been injured by the letting of the Win or Lose. 
The very simple answer to this is: nothing. As can be seen in the clear 
language of the leases, the State received from these leases a one-eighth 
(12.5%) royalty share. This royalty share is consistent with historic leases 
at the time. In addition, the consistency of this amount with that of leases 
at the time—a 12.5% royalty for the State—was the State-mandated 
royalty minimum.409 Thus, not only were the royalty amounts for these 
leases consistent with historic standards, they were also consistent with the 
legally required royalty at the time.410 Thus, under the law and custom of 
                                                                                                             
 408. Id. 
 409. Act No. 315, 1926 La. Acts 606-07. 
 410. A significant fact, as found by Daryl Purpera, is that the average royalty 
rate for the time period of 1920-1939 was 13.0%–an insubstantial difference from 
the 12.5% of the subject leases. DARYL G. PURPERA, Louisiana Legislative 
Auditor, STATE MINERAL AND ENERGY BOARD MINERAL LEASE 
ROYALTY RATES INFORMATIONAL REPORT, 2 (2013). This reality 
suggests that even though 12.5% was the legal minimum at the time, the subject 
leases were not let at the bare minimum based upon some side agreement among 
the relevant parties, but rather they were let at the minimum just like most other 
leases of their time, regardless of the lessor. 
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the time, the State received no less than what it was due under the law for 
these leases. In short, there was no injury to the State fisc in the letting of 
the subject leases and therefore fraud did not, ipso facto, occur in these 
cases. 
Further, under the aforementioned Lease Protection Agreement, 
entered into by the State and several other parties to State Lease 340 in 
1994, the State’s royalty share for portions of certain Win or Lose leases 
has substantially increased.411 As noted above, the original royalty 
percentage received by the State for the Win or Lose leases was 12.5%. 
Under the Lease Protection Agreement, any acreage that is reassigned 
subsequent to the execution of that Agreement is subject to a 60% increase 
in favor of the State (i.e., adding 7.5% to the existing 12.5% royalty, for a 
total of a 20% royalty share). With regard to State Lease 340, not all of 
that lease’s remaining acreage has been reassigned under the Lease 
Protection Agreement since 1994, but the majority of it has. Because of 
this Agreement, of the 75,640 unreleased acres still held by State Lease 
340, 41,320 of those acres (or 54.63%) are paying out royalties to the State 
at 20%, while 34,320 of those acres (or 45.37%) are still paying out at the 
original 12.5%. This important reality means that it is very difficult to say 
that the State fisc is being injured by the continued existence of State Lease 
340. Further, because the State received its statutory royalty due (12.5%) 
prior to the execution of the Lease Protection Agreement, it is similarly 
difficult to say that the State fisc was injured by State Lease 340 between 
1936 and 1994. 
This finding and conclusion leads necessarily to the question or what 
is left to sue for with regard to the Win or Lose leases. The answer to this 
question is not one that has the support of any identifiable legal theory. 
The only thing that the State could sue for as to the subject leases is for the 
hypothetical idea that, had the State not leased to Noe or Burton, it would 
have enjoyed a better royalty rate offered by some other bidder. In other 
words, during the gubernatorial terms of Oscar K. Allen and James A. 
Noe, today the State would have to show that it would have received a 
more advantageous bid than what it received for the Win or Lose leases in 
order to even begin to call into question the propriety of the letting of these 
leases. This task is impossible. Additionally, such a conclusion is not 
supported by the facts from the time. As the Louisiana Legislative Auditor 
has recently found, the average royalty rate at the time was 13%.412 Thus, 
the 12.5% that the State received was unlikely to have been outbid or 
beaten by another bidder during Allen’s or Noe’s terms as governor. 
411. Lease Protection Agreement, supra note 406. 
412. Purpera, supra note 410, at 2. 
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Based upon these realities, this article concludes that, considering the 
evidence, the State of Louisiana was not swindled and was not cheated by 
the Win or Lose transactions. The State received what was legally required 
and customarily due at the time. There is no doubt that the lessees and their 
assigns and heirs have profited from the Win or Lose leases. There is also 
no question that other lessees have similarly profited in the 103 years that 
the State has been leasing its lands for mineral exploration and production. 
This profiting is part of the trade-off of mineral development. The 
landowner, private or public, reserves (where allowed by law) a share of 
the proceeds realized from the minerals derived from its land and the 
lessee, as the party bearing the burden of developing the minerals, retains 
the remainder of the proceeds. Whether and how these proceeds are 
divided among lessees, assignees, overriding interest holders, and others 
is strictly a private matter of no concern to the State. Therefore, 
considering the leases at issue, as long as the State receives its share of the 
royalties as required by law and contract (i.e., its State leases), the State 
has not been injured with respect to the Win or Lose leases. 
B. Likelihood for Success 
Most of the legal theories in this article that propose mechanisms for 
the invalidation of Win or Lose leases are untested and, admittedly, are 
confected on weak legal bases. Very simply, there is no legal theory to 
undo the actions of W.T. Burton, Oscar K. Allen, and James A. Noe, nor 
is it clear that it is in the State’s bests interests to do so. Much of the reason 
for the weaknesses of these theories is the much-belabored lack of 
evidence in this matter necessary to support, much less to prove, a cause 
of action. In addition to the lack of a clearly applicable legal theory in this 
situation, there is no smoking gun in this matter. The question of whether 
the triumvirate of Huey Long, Oscar Allen, and James Noe colluded with 
William Burton to obtain vast mineral leases on State property is a 
compelling question that can and has led to massive amounts of 
speculation. However, the speculation and insinuation of conspiracy 
theories does not equate to evidence sufficient to prove a case in a court of 
law. No documentary evidence has been identified that can serve as a basis 
for invalidating the Win or Lose leases. 
Whether there is enough information available to create a claim to 
invalidate the subject leases is unclear. Virtually anything can serve as the 
basis for a lawsuit, whether it is well founded or not. However, as this 
article has set forth above, insinuation and innuendo do not rise to the level 
of proof sufficient to support the legal theories available for the 
invalidation of the Win or Lose leases. Evidence would have to be real and 
clear. Such evidence has not been identified in such a manner that, as of 
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today, we can say that the State has a cause of action against the lessees, 
assignees, and overriding interest holders in the Win or Lose leases. 
Indeed, the available evidence suggests that the Win or Lose leases 
were granted in compliance with the law in force at the time rather than 
through a nefarious scheme to defraud the State. This reality leads to a 
necessary consideration of one of the apparent motivations for seeking to 
invalidate the Win or Lose leases in the allegations and stories that led to 
the creation of this article: the idea that it is somehow unfair that the 
descendants of Long, Allen, and Noe are profiting today off of actions 
taken by their ancestors four generations ago. This reality can understanbly 
cause frustration, envy, and consternation for modern Louisianans who 
happen not to be descendants of these individuals. However, the simple 
concept that this reality is unfair is not a legal basis for invalidating 
otherwise lawful leases. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has noted, 
“[e]quitable considerations and estoppel cannot be permitted to prevail 
when in conflict with the positive written law.”413 In other words, the 
perception that the State was cheated by way of the Win or Lose leases, in 
the absence of any evidence to support such claims, cannot overcome the 
reality that the subject leases were issued in compliance with the then-
existing law. The State, under Louisiana Supreme Court precedent, cannot 
simply invalidate otherwise valid leases merely because the citizens are 
now unhappy that the Longs, Allens, and Noes continue to profit from 
these leases. 
This does not mean that, should the State opt to bring an action to 
invalidate the active Win or Lose leases, that it might not be successful. 
However, based on the reality that the State has not lost any royalties on 
these leases and based on the lack of evidence and the weakness of the 
available legal theories, any such suit will be, legally, virtually impossible 
and practically unwise. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the analysis, it is not recommended that a suit be filed on this 
matter. The costs are simply too high for a speculative and doubtful return. 
Such a suit does not appear to be in the best interests of the State. In the 
exercise of its fiduciary duty, the State must not only consider the potential 
sins of the past, but also the effects of any prospective actions taken with 
regard to the Win or Lose leases. There is little doubt that a legal swipe at 
the heirs of the Win or Lose fortune would seem to cure a perceived (but 
not proven) moral injustice. However, as is noted above, the costs of such 
 413. Palermo Land Co., Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of Calcasieu Parish, 561 
So.2d 482, 488–89 (La. 1990). 
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an action could be significant and may result in substantial negative 
financial impacts to the State. Further, many of the mineral rights that 
originally began as part of the Win or Lose matter are now in the hands of 
third parties with no involvement in the original acquisitions of these 
interests. The disturbance of these parties’ rights would likely be rebuffed 
by the courts or would constitute contractual interferences for which the 
State could be financially liable.414 
                                                                                                             
 414. The former possibility is based upon the discussion of the rights of good 
faith third parties. The latter possibility refers to the general tort theories related 
to the interference with a contract or a business relationship. See, e.g., 9 to 5 
Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So.2d 228 (La. 1989); Tech. Control Sys., Inc. v. 
Green, 809 So.2d 1204 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/27/02), writ denied, 817 So.2d 100 (La. 
5/31/02); Bogues v. La. Energy Consultants, Inc., 71 So.3d 1128 (La. App. 2 Cir. 
8/10/11). 
